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alAPTU. I. Dl'l'ltOOUCllO. 
Setting and Purpoae 
The role of the induatrlal oraaDization ecODomiat ia to •u•••• 
chngee in the oi:gauisation and working of the economy in relation to 
the achievement of aocicty's goal• (7, p. l). A• a reault of one 
factor that hGa effactcd cbansea iu the organlzetf.ao and working of 
the American economy in the pott•World War II period, American etodeat• 
of an induatrial organisation have become tncruaingly attentive to the 
effect• of meraer1 on competitioo (2,S,14,lS,21,43,78). 
A1J overview of corporate mera•i: activity in AMrican uoufacturloa 
and a1Din1 aiacc 1950
2 
reveal• •everal d:f!Ulalc change• 11hich ha.• 
pro.pted tbia increaaed attention: l) the average number of firms 
acquired annually ~· riaan frOlll about 220 io the 1948-l9S3 period 
to over 11 000 for 196.S.1966 (57, Appeadix, Table 2) i 2) acquiring 
coapani•• with aaaeta greater than $100 aillion accounted for l••• 
than S percent of all acquidtiona in the 19,1·1954 period, while the 
1A mera•r i• the coaabtoatiOll luto a dnale economic eoterpri•• of 
two or aore prmouely independent enterpri•H aQd uy be acco.pliabed 
by acquieitiOD or conaolidatton (61, p. 3). Technically, acqu.iaition 
repreaeata the tak:lna over of one firm by aAother either •• aa iaolated 
event or •• one of an extended aerie• in which the acquired finaa uy 
retain their ident1t1ea (61, p. S9). A conaolidation ia the aiaultaueou. 
multipl .. uaion of two or aore firu f.n which the diaaolvina cmpaniea 
ordinarily lose their identitiea (61, p. 59). Th••• differeucH are 
recopiaed herein, but l.u••ucb •• the 9Dphaaia of thia atudy h on one 
fina gaining control of another, tbe diatiaction• are of lea a importance. 
2t-be year 1950 ia choeen •• a baae point for deacribina change1 in 
mAtrger activity priaarily bee.au•• the paaaaa• of the Celler-ir.fauvar 
alMDdtH"Dt (73) to Section 1 of the Clayton Act (74) .tpified the 
adoptioa of a aore atr1naent public policy with regard to meraer . 
caaparable fiaur• in 1966 va• 28 percent (57, Appeadia, Table• 3 aad 8); 
1 and 3) bori&ontal, YH'tical and conglaaaerate acquieitlone cC*prlaed 
31, 10 aud 59 percent, reapectlvely, of all acquiaitlon• in the 1948-
1953 period, but the coeparable fiaure• for the year• 1960-1966 were 
13, 15 and 72 percent (57, p. ~l). 
Alt atated before, prnioua etudlH have aaaeaaed theae changH 
in corporate .. rger activity primarily with respect to i•pact on the 
competitive behavior of firm.a and performance level• of Aaericao 
iuduatY7. The preaent study eaphasiaea one additional aapect of the 
current aerier aoveaent, the economic force• ruponaibla for, or 
correlated with, tba accelerated merger pace •inc• 19JO. 
Specifically, thia 1tudy attempt• to relate JIOv .. etita in certain 
ecoooiaic variable• to the rate of corpol'ate merger in aggreaate .. nu-
facturing for the period 1951-1966. In addition tbare i• an endeavor 
to ascntain the l'elative importance of aovementa in the rupective 
econCllic variable• in •Ji:Pl.alutng the rate of corporate •erger withl11 
indi Yidual ma11ufacturi11g induatd.ea. Tbeae two purpoau are in 
accordance vi th the •tudy' • central hypotheaia that changea iu var-
table• aaaoctated v1th condition• of buaineaa, the capital .. rket and 
1tbe federal Trade CClllliHion define• boriaoetal aergera aa 
thoae in which tbe 11erging com.pauiea produce one or more cloeely 
reuted product• in the aaM aeograpbic aarket, vertical ••raera 
•• tho.a iu which the ••rging caaapant .. have a buyer- aeller relatiCD-
abip prior to merger end conglomer.te Mrgaa •• the reaiddl of 
meraera uot claaaifled aa either horizontal or vertical (SS, p. 43). 
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growth •r• correlated with tbe r•t• of corpor•te .. raer in Aaerlcau 
aaanul•ctur1ng during the period U!U-1966. 
The folloving diec\dalon relate• to the i•plicattoo• o1 merger 
•ctivity for public goala and public policy. Ch•pt•r II review• 
atudlea ex.mining the cause• of earlier maraer movement• aod con1idere 
the curTent atate of merger theory. Bypotheaes about the factors 
procaptina tbe current wave of mergers cCXJlPriae Chapter III. Chapter 
IV dtH the data aDd deaaribea the atatiaUcal technique 911ployed 
to teat the hypotheses. Chapter V preaenta the findinn• of the 
atetiatical teat• aud the conclusion• d~avn therefrom. 
Public Polley and Hllraer Activity 
Pre1um.ably, the purauit of research aupported by public reaourcea 
i• auided by public aoala. Moreover, it i• •••umed that the antitruat 
framework and other manif eatationa of policy are 1haped by public 
goala. An identification of public aoala relevaut to the oraaniutioa 
of the .Allerico economy ia, theTefore, euential for the under1tandina 
of the implication• of 11.eraer activity for public goal• and public 
policy. 
According to th• President'• Coca'lliHiOU on l•tional Goala, an 
1.mportant, if not PTiwn:y, economic goal ie tbe maintenance of a 
democratic forra of econamic OT&aa.lutioo through the prevention of 
ar .. t cooceatratiao.a of •~Olllic pcrnr (66 1 p. 9). The preaervatiou 
of a democratic econcmy 11 deemed to be coupatible vith the adyanc.aent 
of the other economic aoala of efficiency, full ploymeut, progre11 
and equity (66, pp. 149-206). 
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In accordance with the goal of maintainina a deaocratic: economy, 
Caagrea1 miacted the antitrust lawa, of vbich tb• ori&iDal Section 7 
of the Cl•yton Act (73) and it• 1950 am•Ddmeot (74) are apeciflcally 
applic.ble to tbe effect• of .. r1er oa c~petition. Th• dual 
ecocoaic around• for public reetra1nt of merae-r are that l) mera•r• 
l oetanalbly ioaea1e th• level of economic co1u:eatration, •ad 2) 11er11r1, 
by tncreaaioa concentration, lower the level of eff lciency in the 
econ.amy (7, p. 164; 20, pp. 94-111) . 
Al.moat by definition, at a apecific point in ti.me any auger, 
uh.Cher borisoatal, vertical or conglomerate, rai••• the level of 
aggregate concentratiaa, and a borisontal merger, of cour1e, incr .. ••• 
the level of loduetry or aarltet concentratioo. Yet the quantitative 
iaportaoce of eerge~ in railin& concentration levela u•ed• to be 
eatabliehed over time and th• iaf luence of ether variable• af f ecttng 
concentration dnervee conelderatiou before a judpunlt on the 1eriou.-
DHI of aeraer •• • conc.entratiao-locre••ina force 1• r••ched . 
Th• atatiatical evidesace on the effect of aergera on concentra-
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tlon froa the puiod of the 189~ 1904 urger movement through the 
l Conce:ntratioa, aa uaed in the economic 1en1e, 1• a 1tate of 
ovoerabip or control . Th• degr•• of concentration refer• to the nUlllbe-r 
aud dae diatributioa of firms "'11ch own or control • given economic 
•1ar•a•t• (•uch a• ••l•• or a•••t•). Th• •i•• of ucb fira 1• •M•ured 
by the proportion of the economic •11regate it controls or owns. CQu... 
centratiOD 1• ueully 11u1ured at the 1ndutry level, ref erring to the 
caacentration of control of the econaalc aaar•&at• vitbin a apecific 
lndutr7, or at an aggregate level, denoting concentration of the 
agarepte for the econm7 •• • wbole, or for 1ome broad eector of the 
ecoooay (7, pp. 77-81). 
2t-be identification of .-riou1 ••raer ao.eaenta in the hi1tor7 
of the Americ.n eCOllomy 11 found iu Chapter II on pages 14-22. 
1940'•, though not available for all year• and for all lndu.atriea, doea 
permit ••e geueraliutiona. Durina th• flr•t aerger an••t, 1895-
19041 tbe 92 lat:gut conaolidationa produced cOlltrol of more tun SO 
~cent of th• output of their reapectiv• iDduatrtea (55 1 p. 487) 
and a1 a reault of 318 conaolidationa in the aau period control waa 
obtained over 40 percent of tbe nation'• ••••ta (93, p. 57). While 
the anger aovmmt of the 1920' • vaa pri .. rtly noo-horlaontal in 
chawacter (491 p. 170) aod tbu.a did not affect tnduatry CGaceatration 
perceptibly, the aoY-ent ••• pri .. rily rupouible for the over .50 
percent iucr .. •e during the 190S-193S period in the percntas• of all 
nOD-fi'Q.81.lcl•l corporation• (7 1 p. 108). 8tudie1 by luttera and Llataer 
(19) aud the Federal Trade CGIUd.••ion (8S) auga .. t that .. rgera in 
tbe 1940-1947 period accounted for 1ua tbau 1 percent of the incruae 
in the level of agarepte couceatration and tbat the relatively ••11 
aisH of tbe acqatred fira1 and the predoainantly vertical and con-
aloaerate nature of the acquiaS.tiOIU could not be reaponaible for any 
.. rked incr .. aea in induatry coucentration. 
Thua, tb• effectiv•ea1 of merger• in raillaa conceotratiOD 
levela ln tbe period aubaequat to the flrat major aerger 90VelHllt 
appear• to have declined, both at tbe agaregat• and the iDduatry levela. 
A nwaber of fac:tora My explain tbta pbeucmmon, which i• aHat.naly 
incon•iateat vt.th the fact that a merger, at a aiuale tnataDt ln ti••, 
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doe• increa•• the level of concentr•tion. r1r1t, whether a firm 
chooaee to gro111 by merger or by internal 1aeana, the firm'• .. rbt 
aha"t"e uy be growing at a 1maller rate than the capacity of the 
urket. Therefore, concentration 1• declining ln the aenae that th• 
lira'• urket abare ia falling relative to the total aarket. Second, 
the cc:111petition of new and exi1U.ng Uraa aay erode away the •rket 
abare pined by one firm throuah merger. Third, internal exp41uioo 
of the firm could heve accounted for, aud epparently did in tbe 1940'•, 
a much larger increaa• in concentration truan merger. 
Bence, recognition auat be taken of factora which either tend 
to off aet 1ncreaee• in concentration reeulting fr011 aeraer or are 
relatively more important than aerger •• a cauae of increaeea in 
coocentretion before the merger-coocentretion relationabip 11 cited 
as an ecoa0111ic &TOUD.d for public control of merger•. 
Tb• other economic gTound for public reatraint of aeraere, that 
mergua, by raiains concentration, lover the level of efficiency in 
the econc:111y, lllldt be evaluated accordins to the concept of efficiency1 
in order to determine if only a Wlidiractional, iuver•• relationahip 
prevaib between SHrger• and ef fid.ccy. 
1".Allocativ•" •fficlency, •• uaed here, refer• to the allocation 
of reaourcea aaang lnduetri•• in a faabioo th•t yield• the aad.11U11 
output to aociety (1, p. 374; 201 pp. 103-105). "'Technical" e.fficiacy 
ref er• to the alloc•Uon of reaourcee within firm• in a faahlOll that 
allowa oucput to be produced at the ainima.m attainable Ullit coet 
(71 p . 374; 20, pp. lOS-106). While it la recognised. that aaraar• 
zuy alao have implicationa for the other public, ecOAomic 10.la, only 
the llOl'e dtrect relatiOll8hip between merger• and efficiency ta explored 
here. 
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The theoretical canatruct UDderlytna the relatlORahip between 
aerger• and efflclnc:y, or •ol'e atrictly, concentration and eff1c1eac:y, 
h•• been expreaaed •• a relational •tructure-conduc:t-perfornaance 
cootinaum (7 1 pp. 430-468) . lDduatry structure, t71>ieall1 depicted 
by the level of eeller concentration (7, pp. 112-163), 08teuaibly 
influenc .. induat.ry conduct 1 priurily charac:teriaed by the pl'icing 
and output beha'Yior of fire• in the tndu•try (7, pp. 302-371). 
lndutry perforaauce, mainly portrayed by both tec:bPical and alloca-
ti•• a1pecta of efficiency, r•feTa to the coap0ttit• of ecoooale reault• 
of ea industry's market behavior and la an appreiaal of en iaduetry'a 
contribution to the general material welfare of aociety (7, pp. 372-
429). 
Price theory prOVidee one link betveesa atructure and perf Ol'llMnlce 
in term. of the ralation of concentration to allocative efficitmc:y. 
ctven the traditional auwaptiona of price theory that market• operate 
freely in the abaace of external f orcea and that entrepreaeura attenapt 
l to saaximiae profit• (3S, pp. 189-191) 1 fil'm9 in etoad.1tic induatriea, 
characterised b7 low level• of 1eller concentratloa, charge lower 
pric•• and produce larger output• thau do fir.a iu a onopoliatic 
induatr1ea, identified b7 high level• of 1eller coucentratiOll (7 1 
pp. 28-29) . Moreover, with an ability to re1trict output and rai•• 
l.rbe main fe.ature1 of atoad1tic induatrie1 are many aellera, ... 11 
aiae of each ••ller relative to the total market and lubility of uch 
••ller to influence .. rket price (7, p. 28). In direct contraat, 
aooopoliatic ioduetriea, uaed here in a br04ld 1enee, iaclude 1Ddua-
tr1e1 compo1ed of one teller (llOllopollat) or a ffttl aellera (oli1opoli1ta), 
each aeller haTing an ability to influence market price (7, pp. 28-29). 
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prlcea, moaopoliata or oligopoli•t• e.ru profit• in exc .. a of the 
nor.al level required to iuur• coatiu\l.S production under atGldatic 
condltiOGa of coapetitioa (71 pp. 28-29). In aeaeral, tbia divergeac• 
in profit• b•tween atoaiatic indu.atri•• and 11011opoliatic induatriea 
aignifiee • miaallocatton of rHourcea b•t"een tbe tvo type1 of 
induatriea, or allocative luefficlency (20, p. 13). 
Given the uaUlllptioaa that entrepren•ura ruaw perfect knowledge 
of profit opportunitiea aud that perfect llObility of reaourcea exiat1 
to capture tboae potential profit• (35, pp. 194-195), allocative lii-
efficienc7 ••Y b• corrected either by tran.f errtai reaourcea from 
ato.J.atic induatries to aonopoliatic indnatriea or by epreadlng 
exiattns r•aourcea in aanopolistic in.duatriea ov•r • greater aWDber 
ot f11:llla (20, p. 13). lither method would aatlsfy the conventionally 
aeeumed preference.a of 1octety for larger output and lower pric••· 
Tberef ore, tbe relationahip aeema clear between cooceotratioa 
and allocative efficiency. Allocative tnefficiency eJd.at1 becauee 
the l~•• beaYily conoeutrated, atamiatic induatrie9 cantribut• lllOl'e 
to the production of aocially de1irable output than do the more 
hHvily concentrated, moaopoliatic induatriH. The correctloo of 
allocative lnefficienc:y luvolvH a proceae of "deconcntratlagtt the 
.onopoli•tlc iuduetriea ao •• to redtice the ability of each seller 
to restrict output, charge hi&ber price• and earn exc••• profita. 
It follows that any merger which reault• in an lnoreaee in the 
level of induatry concentraticm ••Y •erve abo to lQIWer the level of 
allocative affid.ency if the aerging firm• tend to act in a 
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moaopoliatic manner. ThU8, price theory prov1dea th• ground• for 
hypothesizlug au tnveree relation between merger ao.d allocative 
effict.ency. 
A aecond link may ez:l•t between 1tructure and perf or..ance in 
terma of the relation of concentration to technical efficteacy. 
Given the aaauaption that bu.aineH firm• attel!Pt to .. Jd.aiae proflta, 
an individual fit:a aeeka to minimize its unit coat• of production 
(71 p. 180). Coat theory (35, pp. 162-184) auageata that the firta 
may be able to reduce ita unit coat of produ.ctioo by increasing the 
1iae of plant up to a point (351 pp. 180-181), that 1a1 by capturiaa 
plant 1cale economies (7, pp. 166-167). In addition, the ff.rm uy 
be able to lower coat• further by operatina ae~eral optimal-aize 
planta in order to gain econmaiea of the multi-plant firm (7, pp. 170-
172) . In abort, to realize fully certaia economies of larae-ac:ale 
plant• and certain additional economiea of the larae-acale, multi• 
plant firm, the fina needs to grow to e0me c:ritlcal milllmua size or 
1cale, at which the firm'• unit coat of production ie the loveat 
attainable. Thia critical minimwa aize ia deaignated the aioimua 
optimal scale of the firm (7, p. 172), the te:bnic•lly efficient Ilse 
of the fira. 
Tbe relation of concentration to technical elficiency becomes 
evident by relati11g the miatmwa optimal acale of firu witbin ao 
iuduatry to the total indu1tr7 aize. It the optimal 1i&e of the fira 
ia large relative to total induetry 1iae, the growth of firm.a to tbi1 
technically efficient 1ise will have •• it• co~aequcmce hiah lnduatry 
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concentretion. That ie, for technical efficiency of finu within an 
induetry to be bi&n, eech firm may be forced to ftToduce a aiuble 
portion of induetry output, thereby reaultina in high level• of 
concentrattoo (7, pp. 180-189). 
The actual relation of meraer to technical efficiency ateaa fram 
the fact that .. Ta•r ta one method of fim growtb the Una uy u•• 
to obtain it• opt1 .. 1 •1••· By aurraer a firm can directly realise 
analtt-.plant econoaie.s, to the eaont that •uch econcai•• enat, awl 
cao obtain, in &tGeral, ocher econOllli•• of lars• f iraa. A hortaontal 
meraer, of courae, rai••• 1Dduatry cor:aceo.tration, but the increase 
in concentration &1)' be conebtent with areateT technical efficiency. 
The hypotheda may be ••t forth, therefore, that merger• are related 
directly to the level of techaical efficiency. 
Tb• ••riouau .. • of the need foT public policy raaardina aeraer 
activity may be indicated by atatiatical tHt• of the bypotbff•• 
that aeraere vary tnveraaly vitb the level of allocative efficiency, 
but directly vith the level of technical efficiency. 1f it 1• aHaaed 
that hortaontal merger• do increase 1Ddu1try concentratiOR, appropriate, 
if e0111..tult ladirect, teat• of tbe bypothe••• would be po.aible by 
rel•ting concentration to the varioue me•eurea of teclulical efficiency 
•nd allocative efficiency. 
Several atudie• correlatiD& induatry ccmcentratioa. to measurea 
of allocative efficiency tend to conftna that a negative relatioaahlp 
•Jd.•t• between the two (21,221 31,36,44,541 91). In direct coutraat 
the scant atatiatical evidence oa. fina else, relative to total indu.tr7 
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atze, J:aquired for technical efficiency doe• not support a poaltiv• 
relation between concentration rod technical efficiency (71 pp. 197• 
199). Thu•, the bypoth••i• that aerse-r activity varie• inver1ely 
with the lnel of allocative efficincy ..... more acceptable than 
the bypotbHi• that merger• are direc:tly rebtad to the level of 
technical efficiency. 
Since meraer actiTity eppear1 ore likely to stifle allocative 
efficiency than to promote technical efficiency, there 1• juatifica-
tian for eome public policy approach to aerier activity and it• effect 
on competition and perfo.nunce in the /IPlerican ecoamy. !•smtlally, 
the qproach takeo may be Oil• of reetrainin1 aerger activit7 iteelf 
or of attackina the c:aueea of mergers. Biatorically, 1ociet7 ha1 
adopted th• toTmer route. 
In detend.ai1l tbe legality ot specific merger•, public decbion--
aaltera, or the courts, have relied principally on the urk.et power 
of the serging f iru. The m11rut power of the meraina firm.a in a 
borisontal aers•r ie directly expreued in the share of the .. rket 
controlled by each ot the fine, and, generally, the courts have 
acted to prohibit me'l'gere iu.olrina 1ubatantial ehare1 of the market 
(88). Vertical mergers are 1crutiniaed for the poaelbility of exteud• 
ina the urket pover of the ••ralna firu frcaa ooe level ol production 
to another (161 87). Finally, the le&•l etatue of couslcaaerate saergera 
h•• been resolved largely oo the opportunity of tbe Aer&iua firm• to 
use their .. rket power in their reapective iud~•trie1 •• a soeana to 
wlth1tand loe1e1 incurred in the undercutti~ of the price• of 
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competitor• (33) OT to increase aales at the elq)en•• of coap•tltora 
through favoritism ln buying and 1elling (32). 
Though economiata are in aeneral agreemeut tbat market power 
ii directly related to anti-coapetitive behavior, certain econQllliata 
feel that the aarket power doctrine ha• been applied too atriugatly 
in aOlfte ca••• (1,2, 15,48) and that tu other ca•••, the market power 
of the =erging firma, not the merger, should be reatricted (23,JO, 
531 78). IA particular, the courta have ignored poaaible econOllie• 
resulting froaa small, hortsontal aerier• and have aeemed to be unduly 
concerned with the urk.et power of eergeTa involvins ahumal ebarea 
of tbe mark.et (16 1 89). In addition aeveral tbeoretlcialUI have 
pointed out that vertical aargers, in themselves, are neutral with 
respect to competition (23,30,53) and that it 1• the monopoly pow.r 
gf tba aergiug ftrma, oot the aaerger, tbat abould be curbed. further, 
Turner doubt• that price-cutting and reciprocal buyina aD.d selling 
even rarely reault froa couglomerata mergera, which 01teu1ibly increa•• 
the likelihood of the two pncticu (781 pp. 134&-1352). Such practice• 
allo depend on the .. rket power of the mer gins firu 1 asid it l• this 
market pov•r, not the meraar, that 1hould be •••ailed (78, p. 1387). 
Tbe af ore-aantioned critici• .. of antiaerger policy have direct 
releTance primarily to the abort run. Judicial dec11lona &eaerally 
reflect • loag-rwa new. Th• court• nidently feel that a aUd 
attitude toward ••r1er1 now, ...,en in c•••• where competition i1 oaly 
minutely affected (•mall hori1oat1l 1lltrger1) or where the e.ffect on 
coapetit1oa l• not attributable to tbe merger (vertical and conglos:aerate 
13 
a•rger•) vlll ill the long run r .. ult ln concentr•ted laduatry etructur••· 
To the ezteo.t benler1t-to-antry pr••n.t new fira. fraa mteriag aa 
illdu•try to r••train exlating firm• from •cttng •• monopol11ta, the 
clo1• scrutiny currently accorded mergers 1• v•rTanted. 
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CBAP'l'D II. •IPLAllATl<llS ~ IAILD& MUGKI. MO'IBMDrS 
AllD THI ST ATB Cll MllGIR TBIC.Y 
141rller Merger Moveaent• 
An inveattgatioo of previoua period• of hip or rlstna merger 
activity h a logical departure point in tbe aul7aia of factor• 
affecting the rate of corporate merger in the perlod 1951-1966. Such 
an inveatigatloo may detect factor• that were preaent in all period• 
of accelerated aeraer activity and~ tbua, indicate the appropriat ... 
ne•• of teating the influence of tho•• COJDaOG factor• on corporate 
aerger acti•ity ln 19~1-1966. Alternatively, the lnveatlgation may 
determine that few, if any, factor• var• com90D to all or even a 
• j ority of the merger mov-ent1, •uagHtiag that a merger mov•ent 
uy be a:plainable only by the unique econoaic enviroaaeut prHent 
at tho U.•e of the .ovement . 
Aa in auy claaalfication proc••• the criteria for aelectin& a 
•pacific period a• oue enco.paHin& a 0 aerge.r aov .. ent" a1 oppoaed 
to • "normal" level of aerier act1.tty are aecea1arlly arbitrary. 
A baaic probl .. exiata ill deteraiain& the initial and tbe terminal 
datu of uch ao•eaent. for euaple, a aerger movemnt uy be 
depicted a• eztadina from one trough of merger actinty to tbe 
folloviug trough, or from peak to peek, or frOll a trough to the 
followt.na peak, or durina • period la 'Which ••raer acti.tty r .... tned 
above aorae 'uorm.l" level. Wbil• thia atudy recopia•• the arbitrari-
nH• of deaianattna initial aDd. ta.inal datea of 11erger •OV•nt•, 
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for th• purpo1e of auna,tna c.autu of ••raer raove;aente th• identtfi-
catioa of earlier aeraer ~· re1t1 primarily on the deteraina-
tian1 .. de in prntoca1 t1erger 1tudie1. A revi" of aerger actinty 
prior to 1950 ind1c.ataa that, to a great extent, the year• of 
abnoZ1a11lly bioh, or sharply ri1ina, meraer activity are included in 
the pertod1 which have been termed "Mratt aovemata." 
AD additional difficulty in deterwin1na vbether meraer act1Yity 
of a certain period conatitutaa • iaergeT aoveraent U.ea iu the choice 
of an index of merger activity. The r&1S11itude of merger activity may 
be deacribed in termt1 of either the n~bar of fir.a d11appearin1 by 
•erger or the liz•• of firae dilappeartn.a by meraer (61, p. 36) . 
Conceivably, the two indicu could aove in different directloaa froa 
one time period to the next, •• vaa tb• ca1e between 1905 and 1906 
(61, p. 371 Table 14) and ~et"lfeen 1907 and 1908 (61, p. 37, Table 14) . 
To indicate th• degree to vblch tbe two lndicu 110.ed together, a 
1 aillpla, rank correlation coefficient vaa computed on the ordering 
of aerger cap1taliaation1, •• • meaaure of fil'la ala••, tlnd the number 
of acquired firm.a in aanufacturtog and aiu1na fo% the period 1895-1920. 
The reaultioa value of .&a vaa ligniflcaut at the 1 percent level, 
ausaeating that either indes h • aui.tabl• caea1ure of the •snitod• 
of •erser activity. Fina di1appearance1 by merger la the 1MU11ure 
l.rbe rank correlatioa coefficimt indicate1 the d•&I'•• to Milich 
two or •or• raukins• of the 1aae variable conHpODd to ••ch other 
(72, pp. 233-234) . In tbla ex.ample, merger cap1ta11utioa• and 11umber 
of acquired firu repreaent alternative ranking• of the .. p1tude of 
aerier activity. 
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choe•o t,n tbia etudy1 though where the data exht1 ••rger capitalisa-
tion9 or the ••••t aisea of the acquiring and the acquired finn.a are 
preaented aa a aupplemental aeaaure. 
Data on the number of acquired Uru in unufacturina and minina 
are preaeoted annu.elly for the year• 1887-1966 on page 17 and aerger 
activity in the pertod 1895-1966 11 graphed cm page• 18-20. The firat 
, .. r for wbicb data on aggreaat• urger actlvlty have been cc.QPiled 11 
18871 while the teraiual year of tbia atudy i• 1966. The srapblcal 
depictiOD. of aerger activity in the period 1895-1966 reveala accelerated 
merger activity d~riug the turu of tbe twentieth century, the 19201 • 1 
the 19401 a and the decade• ol the l9SO' • aud 1960 1 • · Tb• ex.act initial 
and t•raiual datu of each aeraer aovact, with the ezceptlon of tbe 
current aov•ent, ~ve varied from atudy to •tudy (491 611 93), but no 
great exactnea• i• required for ••c•rtaiolns the factor• reepon.ible 
for earlier aeraer ROvement1. 
Accordina to Klrkh .. , .. i.on and Weeton, the firat •«aer move-
••t occuned during the period• 1887-1904, 1895-1904 and 1898-19031 
reapectively (491 pp. 154-166; 611 pp. 33-70; 93, pp. 31-32). It 
would ae .. appropriate to delete tbe period 1887-1894, aa the aunual 
nwaber of aergera reported vaa never laraer than 13 accordin1 to 
Table 2.1. With the ••ception of the comparatively aaall deer .. •• 
in a.-ra•r• from 1895 to 1896, the period 1895-1904 include• the y .. ra 
in which auger activity rote ebarply or vaa bf.ah rebtiY• to 11erge.r 
actinty in the 1905-1918 period precedina the aecond .. rger wave. 
The average aumber of fir.. acquired aDDually in the 1895-1904 period 
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Table 2.1. Jfumber of acquirad firms ln 1nmn\lfecturing and mining, 
1887-1966a 
lumber of Bumber of 
Year acquired firma Year acquired ff.rae 
1887 8 1927 870 
1888 1 1928 1,058 
1889 12 1929 1,245 
1890 13 1930 799 
1891 17 1931 464 
1892 10 1932 203 
1893 6 1933 120 
1894 4 1934 101 
1895 43 193.S 130 
1896 26 1936 126 
1897 69 1937 124 
1898 303 1938 110 
1899 l,208 1939 87 
1900 340 1940 140 
1901 423 1941 111 
1902 37 9 1942 116 1903 142 1943 213 1904 79 1941• 324 1905 226 '\ 1945 333 1906 128 1946 419 1907 87 1947 404 1908 50 1948 223 
1909 49 1949 126 1910 142 1950 219 1911 103 1951 23.5 1912 82 1952 288 1913 85 19.53 295 1914 39 195~ 387 1915 71 1955 683 1916 117 1956 673 1917 19.5 19.57 58.5 1918 71 1958 589 1919 438 1959 83.5 1920 760 1960 844 1921 487 1961 954 1922 309 lS.62 853 1923 311 1963 861 1924 368 1964 854 192.5 554 196.5 l,008 1926 856 1966 995 
a Source•: !887·18~ (25); 1895-1918 (61, p. 371 T•ble 14); 
1919-1939 (77, pp. 231-234); 1940-1966 (83,57,55). 
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va• 301, c~pared to 100 iu 190S-1914 and 113 iu 1915-1918; ~•raer 
capitalizat1one were $61 912.7 million in 1895-1904, compared to 
$21 207 . 4 aillion in 190~ 1914 aud $11 561.3 lldlli011 1n 1915-1918 
(61 1 p. 37, Table 14) . Th••• figure• would .... to ju•tify the 
de•ip.atio11 of 1895-1904 aa the period of the Uret America11 11er1er 
movement. 
Aa Gr•ph 2.1 ehowa, mer &er activity ccxnceaced to ri•• tu 1919 
and remained above World War I level• until 1932. rrOlll Table 2. 1 
it may be ehow tlult average euual ••raer activity wa1 908 in the 
pertod 1919-19301 coepared with 153 ill the follovt.na eleven yur 
period of 1932-1942. Tbua, in comperiaon vi.th period• both before 
aud afteT, meraer activity during 1919-1930 1 according to Karktun 
(49, pp. 167-173), or 1919-1931, according to Releon (61, p. 121), 
appears to be of 1ufficient maplituda to be con1idered • merger 
m(JV .. l!Dt . 
Aa desoutrated by Graph 2. 1, following the extreaely low levela 
of ••raer activity in tbe 1932-1942 period, merger activity began to 
revive durina the wartiae yura. According to Table 2. 1, frca 213 
in 19431 the number of acquired firm• roae to a peak of 419 in 1946 
and declined to 223 in 1948. Tb• amiual average for tbe entire period 
wa1 319, or nurly double the y .. r17 average 1n 1932-1942. These 
fiaures auageat the edoption of 1943-1948 •• a period con•tituting 
• merger mova9Qt1 though a graphical compari•OD of the three defloed 
merger moov.-.nt1 reveal• that merger activity tu the 1940'• did not 
achieve the 1iae proportiou1 of the two earlier merger moveaenta. 
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It may be noted fr• Graph 2.1 tttat aerger actiYity in the pertod 
l9Sl-l966 ha• risen .very year with the exception of four yeara. In 
terma of the number of flrm1 acquired anna.117, the ugaitude of 
current merger activlty hH not yet become a1 la-ge •• the magnitude 
of the firat two mer&er mo.emct1, but preaent merger activity 
dlaplaya a atrong upward trnd. Given abo change• iA the tJPe of 
1 merger• and in the lizH of the acquiring flru, it would ee .. 
appropriate to term merger activity during 1951-1966 a• • aeTger 
movement. 
Where at all poeeible, the aualyaie of caueea of accelerated 
merger activity will be confined to pertocla which have been duignated 
11terger aovemcnt• in tbte. 1tudy. At timea, however, it will be nec-
•H•ry to depart from the e1tabliahed periode, primarily bec:4tu1e 
infona.atlon OD the fac:tora eseociated "1.tb varioua merger movement• 
baa been •••ambled for different time period•. 
The early merger moyempt, 18?5-1904 
The iaprtnt of the 1895-1904 merger aoveaent on the atructure 
of American induatry baa yet to be eraaed. The preaent•day illduatl'ial 
giant• of Aaericu Tobacco Compuy, General llectric Ca.paoy, United 
St•t•• lubber Company, United Stat•• Steel Corporation, Pittaburgb 
Plate Gl••• Com~y, .. tion.al liacuit Company, Baatmau Kodak and 
I. I . du Pont cle lemoura Cmpany repreaent only • few of the 
l See pp. 1-2. 
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multi·m1111on dollar coneolidatione of the early merger period (85, 
pp. 23-24). By 1904, 318 truat• controlled over 40 percent of total 
manufacturing aaaeta in the United States (SS, p. 241 footnote 34) 
1 and meTgera had tranaformed 71 oligopol1•tic or atamiatic induatriea 
into induatrie1 to which a ainsle ••ller dOlllinated (near, or paTtial, 
tllODopoliee) (49, p. 168). Tbua, the 1895-1904 merger movement laid 
the f oundatioo for tbe concentrated industrial atructure so widely 
prevalnt in American industry during the twentieth century (61, p. S). 
Though aubstaotial agreement e.xiata about the intluence of the 
early merser movement on industry etruc:ture, a V9r1ety of explanatiOGa, 
in contrast, baa been offered for ita occurrence (6,25,Sl,76,SS,90). 
The ezplanationa co1utidered here conaiet pd.urily of tho•• on which 
clata permit aame quantitative Judpent. 
Aa the f orution of runy induatriea dominated by a atnale seller 
v.a attributable to merger, it 1• tempting to aacribe the aotive of 
market control to mergers of the 1895-1904 period. Stigler, in fact, 
doea deacribe tbia period •• one of "merger for monopoly" (76, pp. 27· 
31). the ~rket control motive i • difficult, if not lapoasible, to 
aeaeure directly, in the aen.e of determining the preciae proportioo 
of aeraer activity expreaaly undertaken to aain aonopoly control. 
Yet, in an ex post aenae a judpent on the importance of the market 
l OligopolisU.c induatriee, •••times termed "partial monopollea," 
are induatriea in which the aellera are ao f.-w that .. ch 11 able to 
materiall7 affect mark.et price, and in which each ia forced to tab 
account of the effect of bi• pricing and production policiea upou 
•iailar policiee b7 h11 caapetitora (71 1 p. 232). 
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eo11trol motive uy be rendered by deterad.nins the •h•r• of merger 
activity tbat did achieve aark.et control. 
••l•oa, rely1na heavily on data from Moody'• atudy (SS) found 
that 48.6 percent, in terasa of firaa dlaappeerancee, and 70.4 percent, 
in terms of mergeT capitalizations, of total merger activity la the 
1895-1904 period achieved urkat c011trol (61, pp. 101 .. 1021 Table 54). 
Market cOlltrol wa1 defined ae one firm poH•Hbl8 more than 50 pa'cent 
of the market (61, p. 101). While it 11 improbable that all of the 
mergeTe that achieved mark.at cOD.trol were formed aolely for that 
purpoee, the f1ud1na• inf er the preeence of a fairly atrona duire 
to •~1d C011petltion and the proad.1• of monopoly profit• •• an 
effective induceaent for consolidation (61, p. 103). 
In deecribing the urly merger movement a1 one of "merger for 
l1l0ru:>poly" (76, p. 27), Stigler paid only aecoudary attm:lCioa to tha 
poe1ible effect• of other eon.ditione. In contra1t, Bain and We1ton 
1u geet tti.t theae other condition• make up a highly diver1e eet of 
circta8tancea contributing to incrueu 1n a eraer activity at the 
turn of the twentieth century (76, p. 64 ; 93, p. 32) . 
One auch c1rcU1Utance, according to Bain, wa1 the develop!:lm:lt of 
a national tr•naporta tlon l)'•tem at the end of tho nineteeu.th century 
(6, p. 710). Bain'• tbeai• ia that cc.petition w•• intenaified ~y 
the coatinuina growth of the railroad ayataa, which acted to brina 
producera, formerly separated geographically, together in direct 
competition for • aingle, national market (6, p. 710). Merger• repr ... 
emted • device by which producer• could • Hain.ate tbie incre•1ed 
competition (6, p. 710). 
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Th• trauaportatloo arowth-saerger hypotbelie impUea, aaang other 
relatioaebipa, that merger act1'f'ity would occur to a areatar extent 
in indu•triu in vbich a product'• trauportation coat vat high, rathtt 
than lov, relative to it• price (611 p. 79). That is, au improved 
traRaportation a19tem could have only a minute effect on the potential 
aeographic aarket for product• vboae trauportatioo coeta vere 
prniouly low. A national urket probably alr .. dy ed1t.S for 1uch 
product•. In contrast, the high tran•portatlon coat• of other product• 
could be eqected to be reduced coDaidarably, pnina the vay for 
producer•' entrance• into natioaal .. rt.ta (61, p. 79) . Th••• 
produc:era would have an incentive to avoid the intendfied caspetl-
Uon that would potentially eu1ue by 11:ergiug. 
To t••t the relationahip that merger activity occlllTed with 
greater frequacy in bi~ tran1port-coat lnduatrlea than in lov 
tranaport-coat indu.atriea, Bel1on aaaigned merger activity, vbere 
poeaible, ill the P«t'iod 1895·1904 to oa.e of two categoriea: l) 
iwhi1trtea vttb low tranaportatioa coat• rel8tive to product price; 
Gld 2) induatrie• with high trao.aportation co1ta relative to product 
price (61, p. 83). The 1pecific, numerical relation of biah and low 
tnuport•tiou coeta to pri~• ,,.. undefined. Of th• merger actinty 
that clearly fit into tither of the tvo diviaiona, 57 percet occurred 
in. high traaport-coat 1nduatriH •• oppoaed to 43 percent in low 
tranaport-coat 1nduatr1ea (61, p. 84, Table 46). Thl• finding tend1 
to confirm th• tran1portati0J1 powth-merger hJPotheaie. 
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According to .. laoa, the traoaportation srowth-aeraer tbe.ia 
further iapllea thac in the blgb traneport•coat indu1tri•• exhibiting 
aerger activity, production would he widely diaperaed 1eograpbicall7 
(61, p. 84). The reasoning i• that reduced transportation coa'ta could 
hardly change the atate of competition if producer• were concentrated 
in ooe small geographic area (geogX'aphic coocentratlon of one) (61, 
p. 84) . lielaon, however, failed to recognise that, on~• geographic 
concentration became le•• than one, JMarger activity could not be 
expected to become any more frequent with deer••••• in aeosraphic 
concentration (291 pp. 94-96). For ex.ample, 1f1 within a particular 
industry, 80 percent of the firm. are located remotel1 from the otber 
20 percent 1 there ia no ruaoo to expect l•H meTger act1 'rity than if 
tbe figurea were 60 and 40 (29, pp. 94-96). That la, in either 
inatauce the firma in uc:b group migbt have 1aerged UlOD& tbeuelve• 
juat al well GI with firu in the other sroup (291 pp. 94-96). 
Thia objectiOD to llelaoa' a logic: demonatrat•• that the theala 
doea not neceaaarily imply • negative relation between merger activit7 
and a•o&raphical concentration aa auggeatad by lelaon. Hel\ce, ltelaoo'a 
fiDdlng that the aaaociatiou between =~rger activity and goographical 
CODcentratloa. (61, p. 86, table 14) vas poattlv• ln the 189.S-1904 
period appear• irrelevant, aud, tbua, the ilaprovemesat of the trans-
portation ayatem auat tentatively ata.Dd •• a c:onditloo con.tributing 
to increased merger activity. 
A aecoad cit'camataDce which baa been aaaerted •• induciag the 
early aerger llO"ftment la the development of the modern c:orporatioa 
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(76, pp. 28,64; 931 p. 82). The llberallsatloa of •tate incorporatiOQ 
lave lu the la•t t~o decade• of the nineteenth century auppoaedly 
effected tbia development by ellmillatius •~ral reatrictiOD• on 
mergers (76, p. 28, footnote 14; 93, p. 82). The Kev Jeraey Bolding 
Company Act of 1888 initiated auffic1esatly aevere competitioa among 
1e.eral atates to garner buain••• ineorporationa that, by 1900, 
corporation• i'D many state• could bold 1tock in other corporatiODa 
and merae vith other corporauoaa, were allowed to do buaill••• out-
aide the state of 1.Dcorporatioa, could eachange ~pital aaaeta for 
atock without unan.1moua con.•ait of atockholdera, and were ,.rmitted 
high limit• on their capitaliaatiOll• (61, p. ''' 76, p. 28; 931 p. 82). 
Accordin1 to B•laon, obaervina the dlatribution of c:onaolidatloa 
activity according to both Ngnitude of capitalluticma and induatrial 
variety by atate of incorporation in tbe period 1895-1904 1ugaeata 
the d•ar•• to vbicb conaoltdatlon activity reapoa.ded to chan.1•• in 
tbe corporatlon lan of dlffereut atatu (611 p. 66). Seam found 
that the eiaht leadiQ& atatee in the o.waber of incorporation.a attracted 
more highly capitalised conaolidatiOl19 cud a wider iuduatrial ••rlety 
of coaaolidationa than did atatea with a fewer number of iocorporationa 
(61, pp. 6S-701 Table• 36-40). To khan, tbeae two findinga iDdicat• 
that corporation lawa peraittina freer choice of lin•• of bu.aineaa 
and aetting higher Uaite on authorised capitali&atioa. lured uny, 
l•T•• ccinaolidatioaa that lligbt have othervi•• incorporated isl their 
boae atatea (611 p. 70). 
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Bawner, .. laoa'• a•••rtlon may be qu•lifled by the f•ct th•t 
it i• quit• concelyable that the econcmic enviromaent f.a atatea having 
lf.beral illcorporatiOD lm simply vaa not conducive to the f oraatlon 
of bu•ln•••••· A more correct atatement about the influence of the 
developatmt of the aodarn corporation on the early aer1eor lllO,.ment 
would be that tb• 11berallaatlon of incorporation lava permitted 
IMrgft •ctlvity tO take place Oil a sreater 8C-ale than would baye 
beaa the caae in the abaence of auch llberali&•t1on, but that the 
relaxation of incorporation lava, in 1teelf / v•• not a eufftcient 
condition for larae-•c•l• .. raer activity. 
Th• tvo hiatorical develop.ea.ta Of the modern corporation and a 
natl on.al trauaportatf.on •)'St .. haft been Haigned only rebti vely 
llf.nor i-olu by ••• atudenta f.n C011P9rlaon with a third aajor bhtori-
cal developaent, tMt of an oreanised, larae-scale upltal .. rut in 
tbe latter part of the nineteenth century (491 pp. 162-163,167; 72 1 
p. 492; 931 p. 82). Stigl.r h•• act...anef!d the theai• that • large 
~pital aarket vaa eaaeutial to the marketability of the brge 
••curiti•• of tbe early 111Ulti-eillton dollar con.eolidationa (76, 
pp. 27-,l). To eatabliah the validity of thia the•i•, it l• aeo-
••••ry to detend.ue, firat, if the caplt•l •ark.et had reached a 
aufficintly adnnced 1ta1• to be capable of playing aa blportant 
role lu the .. rly aerger aove9e0t and, ••coud, tf, in fact, the 
conaoltdatioo• of tbl• .. rly aerger ,.riod uaed, to any are.t extetit, 
the capital aarket to market their aeeuritie1. 
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Some indication of the dnelopment of the capital urket at 
the time of the firat muger movement may be pined by viewing the 
growth of the llev tork Stock lzcbange (61, p. 90) . Fram the cntd of 
the Civil War uutil the aid-1890'• the n\Bber of atock iaauea liated 
ro11e almoet evuy year, tbue increHina the "breadth" of the capital 
market (61, p. 90). PTOll 1895 to 1904 the number of U.•ted ieauu 
remained pra~tically conataot in contrast to the abarp rt•• in 
tradlna activity; that ia, the market for the average iaaae deepened 
(61, p. 91) . Belaon concludeti that the "breadth" .ud "depth" of the 
capital market nad increaaed, by the late 1890 1•, by • dear•• ar••t 
enough to enable the capital urket to play ao important role in the 
1895-1904 erger mov•aent (611 p. 91). 
lot to ha euldned ia the degree to which the merging finaa 
utilized the organized aecuriti•• marbta ln aarketlng their 
securities iaauea. Thia questicm cau be answered either directly 
ol!' indirectly. Directly, the eattmated proportion of all 1897-1902 
CQQ&olidationa vhoae •tocks were traded on the Bew tork Stock l•ch•na• 
in the three yeara followina the time ot conaolldation vaa 64. 3 
pe::cent in terzq of capitaliution1 (611 p. 921 Table .50) . •urtber, 
thia eatt .. te ii a mi.nimwa proportion of conaolidatioo activity that 
utilized all 1ecuritie• m.u·keta beuuae aecuritiu traded on t he 
unliated aeeuriti•• markata and on minor orsanised exchaua•• were 
excluded (61, p. 93). 
An indirect demo1Htration of the degree to which the early 
cOD.1ol1datioa1 employed the aecurt.Uu urbta to .. rkat their 
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aecuritiea iaau•• .. 7 be noted by aacertaining the 1iaportance of the 
eale of induatrial aecuritiu to the general public for caab iu the 
1898-1902 period (61, p. 93). The finding would indicate the role 
of the aecuriti•• eacbngea in ••lling new 1Huea generally and, by 
inf ernc., in urbtina eonaoU.datton ia•u•• •ince coaaol1dati011 
teauu predmioated among nav aecuritiae i11uea of the 1898-1902 
period (61, p. 93). If, during • aeraer boom, caah ••l•• of aecuriti•• 
to the public incru1ed relative to the aa0t.mt of atoct exchanged 
for the aecUl'1ti•• and ••••t• Of other com,pantea, the organisttd 
••curitiu .. Ttet would appear to f acil1tate the increaaed merger 
activity (61, pp. 93-94). Iu fact, a cQllPariaoa. of the 1903-1907 
period of low merger activity with the 1898-1902 period of peak 
merger activity reveal• t~t ca1b ia1uea of atock did increaae 
rei..ttve to atock exchanged for at.bu coapanlea aa1eta or aecuritiea 
(61, p. 941 Table Sl), auggeatina tbat th• uae of or1.,Used excbanae• 
to effect caah ••l•• of atock served to enhance the .. rketebllity of 
conaolidation ieau .. and, tbue, the likelihood of coa.aolidetion. 
A aecood th••i• about the role of tbe capital market in the 
early aerger aovement, 189'-1904, le tbet an organi&ed ca'lt•l market 
provided a IMdimt by which promoter• of mergera could pther the 
fin.aucial power needed to induce independent firu to couolidate 
(49, pp. 162-163; 61, p. 89). Supposedly, the act of ccmaoltruat1on 
afforded praaotere and participating entrept'euur• an opportunity 
to .. rltet new aecuritiea •t•l'Gat the aame ••••t• becauae the di•-
CO\lllted value• of •xpected future earainga of the combined enterpriaea 
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freq\Utlltly exceed.S th• elliatiDg book value of ••••t• (491 p. 163). 
The proaoter of a Mrger had an 1Dcentiv• to inflate th• value of 
expected future earning• because doing eo would increaee hie profit•, 
or the difference betveeu the old and new aeaet valuation• (491 p. 163). 
Thus, rwoponente of the the.ta would argue that promotiot:Ull profit• 
were a dcainant aotive for 111uger in tba 1895-1904 period. 
Al in ••••urlns th• market control motive, it ia 4iffic:ult, if 
uoc impoaalble, to aaaHa direetly the illlportance of promotion.al 
profit• in inducing mergera in the 189.S-1904 period. Even if • 
direct apprai•al were po.aible1 it mu1t be re&aeabered that aome 
prcaotion 1• required for mo•t aera•r•, if only to aullorate 
diffaenc•• amens the paniclpating lnduatriali•t• about the opera-
tion or aanaaement of the ccnblned firu. further, to the extent 
tluat the motive behind a particular merger re•t• on the opportunity 
to piu Ja0nopol7 profits or to achieve reduced coat• in operation 
or any otb•l' aound econadc baae, the potuti•l for prcaotu•a 
prof it• deaervea lea• cosuiderat1on than oth•rwie• •• an induce.ent 
to 11ter1er. 
•onethelu11 a judgmmt, however tenuous, of an ex po1t uture 
uy be qde of the prc:aoter • • role ln the early zaeraer ao.ment by 
detel"llinlns the failure rate aaoaa tbeae early mera•r•. O.tenatbly, 
11erger1 hied on the c:bance to pin aarket control, reduced coat• 
of operation, or SOIH other ''real" profit would be more Ubly to 
aucc•ed tbao vould aergera f oraed aolely on the baaia of proaa.otioaal 
considerations. The atudiea of Deving1 Livermore and the .. tional 
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Induatri•l Conference Board all atteat to a relati••ly bigb incidence 
of failure, ranging fraa 47 percent to 85 pel'ceut, ellDllg early merger• 
(49, pp. 164-165; 591 pp. 28-119). Markham lnfere that prolllotional 
profits were likely the doadn.ant motive tn the formatf.ar1: of ••raer• 
that failed, while the prof ttabl~ mergers probably vere founded to 11 
great extent on the very real po.aibilitiee of urket dc>miiuince and 
ecoo.omie• of conaolidatlon (491 p. 163). It 111U8t be added, however, 
that there uy be and likely are other variables, euoh ae buaineaa 
conditions, affect1ns the auccea• or failure of aergera. 
legardlea• of the motive• of pr•oters ln forming mergera, their 
task would requ.tre leH effort to tb.e degree that conditiOM exiat to 
1) ede the difficulty of financing mergera and 2) enhance the profit 
pot.entul of mergers. It would seem that riling eecuritiea demand, 
ae reflected by ri•ing securitiH price in the l89S-1904 period 
(611 p. 164, 'fable C-7) would ineure • market for th• typically large 
atoclt iasue1 of the aulti-ld.llloa dollar consolidation.a of this period. 
In addition, the buaineaa prosperity of the 1890'• and early uoo•a 
(611 p. 164, Table C-7) would be expected to 1ncreaae, more than 
decruae, the proepecta tor a •rser•a p~oflta~llity (491 pp. 46-54; 
90 1 p. 3S). 
Bel1on ha• atat1at1cally teated the relation of bu1iuea1 and 
capital aarket coaditiona to 11•rser activity for the period 1895-
1904 (61, pp. 119-120). There •• aignifi caiit correhtion at the 
5 percent level ot ri.goificance betve&n merger activity and ilMiuatrial 
etoetk prices, but no aignitiaut correlation between merger activity 
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end iuduatrul production (61, p. 95, Table 52). The ftadina• tnd 
to confirm tbat a thrivill& capital urket va• conducive to the 
large-•cale merger activity that occurred at the turn of the tveatietb 
century and that the effect of buaiue•e conditions ••• oaly minimal, 
lf preaent at ell. 
In auaaary, alaoet all ot the explanation. of the 1895-1904 
•rger mwment con•ide~ed in thla 1tudy appear to baye •ome atatlatic.l 
ba11•. There i• evidence to indicate that th• 1110tive of mark.et 
control, the develop;senta of a natiOIUll tEan•portation •1•ters and 
the modern corporation, and condition. in the capital •rket all were 
reapouible to som.e degree for tbe 1895--1904 merger mOftaient. 
th• 19lt-1930 merger movement 
The .ts• of the 1919-1930 aaera•r aovemeat a• ••••ured by the 
total number of acquired finaa va1 anr three u .. 1 that of the 189S-
1904 aerger move1111nt. While approxiaately 31000 firaa vere acquired 
in the 1895-1904 period, about 11 1 000 firm.a vere involved in 111traer• 
during 1919-1930. Yet, th• effect of tbe ••cond Mrger aonMDt on 
the structure of, and competition ln1 American indu•try waa aot nearly 
•• pron.ouaced or nec•a .. rily aa detrimeatal •• it• •iae would •uage•t . 
Th• characteriatice of the llOYelllel\t which explain thi• unexpected 
r••alt are to •ame degree related to factor• which uy have pt:o.pted 
the 1919-1930 .. raer aoveMnt. 
<kle of the cbaracteriatic• reapoaaUtle for ret•rdina the acw ... 
m.nt '• effect on co.petition h that public ut1lit7 fine and baulr.i.ng 
concern. accounted for 24 percent and 9 perceat, reapectively, of the 
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•cctu.ired flraa in 1919-1930 (49, p. 168, Table 5). That i•, one-third 
of the 1919-1930 merger• occurred in lndutri•• regulated to ••• 
d•p•• by public authority, or where cc.petition vu not espected to 
operate (491 p. 169). Bence, the monopoly aotiv• would appear iu-
applicabl• to at leaat one-third of the meTger• in the 1919-1930 
period. 
Stisler, how.ver, felt tbat 1111n7 mergers tran•for.ed iDduatrl•• 
dOllJ.uted b1 a alugle lira into oligopoliea and va• led to clulracteria• 
the period •• one of "merger for ollgopolr' (76, p. 31). A• exnplea, 
be dtea the c•eae, can, petrolem, automobilee, agricultural iaple-
••Dt• aud gla .. induatri•• (761 p. 31). Suppo.edly, thou&h the number 
of fin• waa reduced thr•ah ••raer, aerger• enabled aany firaa to 
atra,tb• their ccapetitiv• podtioa against the indu.try ludu 
(49, p. 165). 
The e.xaapl•• are, of courae, of an •~ poet nature, aince it 
re•iu unbOWD the u.i>er of auaera undertaken preciaely to allow 
for aore effective competition apt.nit the induatry luder. further, 
the extent to 1ib.idl oliaopoli•• aroee by the .. raer route in the 
1920'1 .. , be overstated. Of 22 oligopoliatic induatri•• etudied 
by We•ton, only nine, OT lees thn balf, eprang up by merger (93, 
p. 64). 
A eecond cluaractertatlc which undoubtedly acted to restrain the 
iao•raent'• effect Gil induatry atructure dul1 with the ratio of fina 
diaappurances during the movftletlt to the total number of firms in 
opel"ation for ..-.eral industrial groupa (49, p. 169). U1ina rath.r 
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broad induatrtal aroupa, M.rklula found that in only two of dx •11v-
facturi111 aud mluiq indu.try groups wH the proportion of f1ra die-
appearnca1 tu tbe 1919- 1930 period relative to the total 1umber of 
fir.1 operating in 1929 greater than 2 percent (49, p. 168, Table S). 
It would be expected that •• aerger• occurred with greeter frequency 
between finaa within the .... indU8tries than between firm• in 
differnt indutrie1, the proportioo would increaae. Thua, the lav 
ratio• that actually prevailed would , ... to indicate that 1aerger1 
were foraaed •croa1 i!lduatry lloe1 ~Ol'• often than vltbiu induatrl••· 
U urger activity were of thia uatu&"e, ev1dntly the 1919-1930 
aergera were prtaarily vertical aud cousl•er•t• in type (49, pp. 
170-171) aGd could have hardly affected 1adu1try 1tructure directly. 
The 1.alplication of thi• finding i• that motive• aaaociated wt.th 
vertical and cooglC1111erate mergers •1 ba'9e induced, to 10.e degree, 
the aecond aerget: aovemeut. Apparently, fir.1 vented to obt•i1l the 
teclutical &•ina of vertical integr•tioo, to reduce their dependence 
on other firm.a for iuput1 and to achieve cost reduction• by coneolldat-
ing ••le•, dietrlbution and adverti1ing org,ani&etion1 (49# p. 210; 
90, p. 61; 93, p. 83). 
Though the deairea of ft.ruse to merge for oligopoly and to pther 
the economic benefit• of vertical and conglomerate merger• .. , have 
accounted for •Gia• of tbe 1919-1930 merger•, Jllarkhaa, Tborp and 
Weeta.a bave •••i111ed aClale empba1i1 to the prof eeeiOIUll proaoter in 
tupirtug the eecond merger moyement (49, p. 173• 77, pp. 8.5-86; 
93, p. 83). A• mentioned 1A tbe exod.a.tion of the promoter'• role 
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in the fir•t merger aoveacat, it 1• difficult to differentiate between 
J>TC*otion ba•ed OD the opportunit7 for •OIU "real" aaisa tbraugh aersu 
end prcmotioa ba•ed solely on the p088lbiU.ty of pwomocer'a pro!ita. 
Yet, certainly the bualnee• proaperity .-nd the rialng aecuritiea 
prtcH of the 1920' • (61, p. 166,, Table C- 7) ude promotion eaaier 
than would ha.a been th• ca•• in their absence. 
Statlatically, conditions of buaineaa and the capital market 
appear to have been important factor• in tbe second aergu movemesat. 
Var the period 1919-19311 ••laoo found • a1gnif1cent correlation at 
the S percent level between ••raer activit7 and both iruluatrial 
production and atock prices (61 1 p. 118, Table 60). 
Summarily,, the available •~den.ca 1• c0ft8iatent with ascribing 
aaae influence to th• motive of oligopoly, of gain• frm •ertical aod 
caoglGlllerat• aergera aad of prQaOtera' profit• in proraptina the 1919-
1930 aeraer move:meGt. 
The 1943-194! !ffgtr •!f!!!!t 
Th• explanatiOl18 offered here of tbe 1943-1948 aeraer aove11ent 
are uot of the larae-acale aera•r activity vblch occurred at the tum 
of the tvent1.eth century and 1n tbe 1920'•· A• Graph 2.1 on page• 
18-20 clearly r .... 1., tbe 1943-1948 .. raer movemeDt did not achieve 
the sis• proportiODa of the flrat two meraer aaovemn.t•. Thia df.aparlty 
in ais• between the 1943-1948 aerger llOYeaent and both of the earlier 
merger wave• i• important to note for it auas••t• that coodt.tlon. 
aHociated with t.he earlier 11eraer llOVeMDta may not ha•• been preant 
to tbe aame deg~••, if at all, dur1D8 the 1943-1948 period. 
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In iteelf the relatively small magnitude, in term. of number of 
acquired firaia of the 1943-1948 merger aoveraent would dlecourage 
attributlna the movement to the traditional •oti•e of market control . 
Aleo, the merger activity of the 1940'• diaplay1 other propertiea 
which appear to be inconaiatent with the market control aotive. 
One of the propertiea coucerna the dietributioo of the acquired 
and the acquiring firm• by aize cla••H· !be relevaut ioformatiOll 
i• not expllcf.tly available for the 1943-1948 period, but the Federal 
Trade CoaunlHiOD • 1 etudy of the 1940-1947 mer1er1 would •••• to permit 
a sufficiently reliable desr•• of aenerdisatf.on about the 1943-1948 
mer&er•. The CoDDi••lon found "that fully 93 percent of all the 
firaa bouaht out in the 1940-1947 period held aa1eta o~ leaa tbaa 
$5 million, and 71 perc ut had lH• than $1 million of aeeeta" 
(361 p. 28). Table 2.2 belov f~ber illu.etratee that over 60 percent 
Table 2.2. Si•• of acquiring and acquired concerna, 1940-1947a 
Sise cl••• 
($ 111.llton of ••••t•) 
Ullder $1 
$1 - $4 
$.5 - $9 
tlO - f49 
Over $49 
Acquieitione made 
by acquirioa concern• 
239 
36.5 
264 
S90 
604 
2,6'2 
asource : (85, p. 176, Table 47) . 
CODettTlla 
acquired 
1,468 
4SS 
58 
66 
lS 
2,062 
of all acquiaitiona wer• .. de by f traa with aaaeta •r•ater than $10 
llillioo. Preauaably, the duir• to 1ncreaae mark.et power would baY• 
38 
been reflected to a greater extent by large firtu merging with large 
firma, rather than with •mall firaut •" the data indicate. In fact, 
no merger• occuTred between firms, each vf.tb asset• of over $100 
million, and only one took place between firms, each with aneta 
greater than $50 million (22, p. 47). 
AD addition.al property of the 1940'• merger movement that •ervea 
to further refute attexnpts to acC'l'edit the movement to a drive tor 
monopoly pertains to the economic relaU.onahip betwe.aa the mer ging 
f iriu . A crude infeTence about tbh relet1onahip csn be made by 
relating the nU01ber of firut d11appearancee through Qerger to the 
number ~f f 11'11• in operation for variou• induetr1es. Again, the 
pertinfl'D.t informatiOD bH been aeeembled only for the period 1940-
1947. Kirkham eatimatea that 1n 13 of 14 t111nufacturin1 induatri•• 
the ratio of fi1'11l dtesppearancea ln 194<>-1947 to the number of flrma 
tu operation in 1947 vaa l••• than 4 percent (491 p. 17S, T•bl• 6). 
U1ually, the ratlo would be expected to increaae •• merger• occurred 
to a gTuter extent between fircu in the aaae induatri•• than betven 
firu in different ia.duatriea. Th• low ratio found in alao1t all 
iaduatries (49, p. 175, Table 6) 1ua1•1t1 that horlsontal eergar 
acti'fity wae not •flrY exten81••· O.tendbly, the goal of UTbt 
control would be more readily achieved by borisontal •erger tbau 
other typee. Thu•, the rebtively 1mall number of acquired fircu, 
the preponderance of acqui•itiona of amall fir.. by larger firaa, and 
the relatively infrequent bortsootal merger activity all intiauate 
that merger activity 1n the 1940'1 did not have •• it• aia market 
control (49, p. 179). 
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The obv•r•• inference that uy be dravo froa the lov percatage 
of f ira dl••PJMt•rancea to total f lraa iu opuation far noet induatri•• 
i• that a large proportion of •arger activity in the 1940*1 vaa vertical 
and cGnalcaerate in nature. A~ain, aa in the 1920'•, the logical 
iaplication 1• that the aerglng f i1:1aa desired to galD the econOlllic 
beneflta of vertical and conalomerate mergera. Some endence on 
the actu..1 frequency of tbia active ia anilable from the luttera-
L1ntner atudy of 1940-1949 mergua (17 _,18). Their field aurvey of 
over 100 ••Tgera ahowed that approxlutely one-third of tboee 
acquiaitiona were aade to acbine a arut:er degTee of vertical int• 
gratlCQ (18, p. 378) and that over half repreeented atteapta to 
rmuce cyclical fluctuation• iu bueiAH• by adding a new product 
(18$ p. 376). 
lnaa11Uch •• the •era.er IROVelMDta of 189~1904 and 1919-1930 
were aa•ocuted to a large elKtent vttb a tbri~ins capital aRbt and 
occurred during buaisleea prottperity, it would aen appropriate to 
exalline the corr•l•tion of merger activity in the 1940'• with move-
ment• in indu1trial production and atock pricea. ..laon detel'llined 
there vaa aipificant poeitive correation et the S percent level 
between merger• and atock pricH, but none betwen mer1er• end 
induetrial production, for th• period 1943-1954 (61, p. 118, Table 
60). far the period 1943--1948, where Mrger activity va1 au'bata_ntially 
aruter than that during the 1ubaaquent •i•yur period 1949-1954, 
correlatioo1 were computed uaing ••l•an'• quarterly data •eri•• of 
the three variable• •• preaented in table 2.l on paae 40. The rea'11t1 
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obtained differed froaa l•laon 1 a in that aerger actiYity did not appear 
to be aipiflcasatly related, at tbe S percent level, to •itba- induatri•l 
production or atock price.a for the period 1943-1948. Apparently, the 
aaaodatiOll between moveu.uta in ~e_r1er activity and movemants in 
Table 2. l . J>irm diuppearan~•, atock pricea and induatrial produc-
tioo. (1947-1949) • 100)1 by quarteTa, 1943-l948a 
Stock IP.du.Cd.al 
Year Quarter Diuppearancea pricaa production 
1943 l 50 127.6 123 
2 50 138.l 127 
3 Sl 138.8 129 
4 S9 135.3 l.30 
1944 l 78 137.3 129 
2 es 140,6 126 
l 84 146.7 123 
4 78 148. 0 123 
1945 l 68 lS.S.9 125 
2 60 164.3 119 
3 84 169.9 100 
4 109 188.9 87 
1946 l 108 196.4 85 
2 146 20.5.4 87 
3 114 190.5 93 
4 6.5 170.5 96 
1947 l 112 178.l 99 
2 104 171.2 99 
3 87 180.S 99 
4 102 180.5 102 
194a l 67 172.6 103 
2 59 18.5.6 103 
3 53 182.8 104 
4 44 180.4 104 
8 Source: (61, p. 168, Table C..7). 
stock price• during the period 1943-1954 vaa not prHent in the aame 
dear•• duriua the •ub-period 1943-1948. 
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The leek of • a1gn1flcant relation betwee merger activity and 
atock pricea for the 1943-1948 pertod appeara to be conai1tnt, or 
at leaat doe• uot conflict vitb, tbe auggeation made by luttera aDd 
Lintner and We1ton t~t the low price• of 1ecuritiea in relation to 
earuing level1 prGmpted many ftrma to acquire, by atock purchaae, 
other fir:me in1tead of con.tructtns plauta (17 1 p. 77; 93, pp. 81,84). 
~hat i•, depre1aecl atock price• teud..S to atbuuate mergera becauae 
buyera could acquire •H•t• at • lover co•t by purcha.S.ng another 
c•pany, tho by btdlding the facilitlea tbesuelv••· 
Acccn-ding to Weaton, au additional varla~le that ap,.ara to have 
been • dOllJ.n.ant force in merger activity of 1940'•, especially of th• 
puk 7eara 1943-1948, vaa tbe extremely high level of tautiGD (85, 
p. 84) . luttera and Lintner have explained the role of tau1 ln 
aotivatlq .. rgera and eD1dued the extent to vbich taxH may bn• 
induced aerge~ act1vtty during the 1940'• (20,21). 
the federal taa atructure enrted preHure on the OWDH'• of 
cloeely held bua1n .. 1e1 to 1all out or 11terge vitb large cQ11Panie• 
iu tvo vaya. rtrat, the OVllft may have leHened the impact of P•Jina 
the federal eatate tax on hie heir• by 1ellina the bu1ia ... (17, p. 70), 
nu though the amount ot the tax remained coaatant. U OWDere of 
cloaely beld buaiD••••• are to pa11 tbair holding• OD to their bef.r1, 
they llU.lt accumulate large amount• of liquid aaaeta in orde• to provide 
for the pa,.ent of their eatate t.az and for their other liquidity 
need• (20, p. 72). The heavy tautlon, includt.na the pttsOIMll and 
corporate inc-.e tax, of liquid aHet1 during the war ude accumulation 
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of such aa .. t• coatlJ and ezarted acme preaaure Oil owoere to aeek 
other me8118 of pr0Yid1u& for the eatat• tax (17, p. 72). ly ••llina 
the atock in their bu.in•••••, owner• relieved, to aaae degree, the 
burden placed on heir• of paying th• eatate tax (17 1 p. 70). 
Second, the ••l• .a.bled the OWD•r• of cloaely held bta11in••••• 
to take their prof it• out of the buaineH by the capital galna route 
(20 1 p. 70). The gaim from audl 1ale• were, ln general, long-term 
capital gain•, me! were taxed at a ux:hwa rate of 2S percellt (171 
p. 72). If the fund• wen takeil out of the buainua a• divideuda, 
they could be taad twice, once at tbe corporate ln•l u earning•, 
and once again •• dt.videade, at the peraaul incom. tax ratea, which 
vere •• high •• 82 percent, under the 194& aevenue Act (171 p. 73). 
The Buttera-Lilltner field aurvey of over 100 aergera from 1940 
to 1949 provt.du aome 1ndiution of th• extent to wbicb taxu were 
a aotivation for the Hle of compani .. (17,18). Taxu appured to 
be a major conaideration in the sale of 10 percent of all coapniea 
aold and 25 percent of all companiH with aaaete Sl'Mter than $1 
milUca (18, p. 366). The 10 percent •ccounted for 25 percent of 
the ••••ta of all canpaniea aold and 33 percent of the aaaeta of all 
acquired coaq>aniea wt th aaaeta greater than $1 million (181 p. 366). 
Unaurpriaingly, ta ... weTe relatively •or• important in the aale of 
large ccmpanlee th•n .-.11 c011pani•• (181 p. 366). 
ID aumm11ry, the 1943-1948 merger aovemeut doea uot appear to 
bne reflected attempt• by bu.ainua fima to gain urket control. 
Inatead the objectivea of acquirlna fil'lla aea to ha" been the 
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achievnwmt of • more 1ub1ta1ltlal degree of vertical integration and 
divcrdfic.atioc, while tax conliderationa vere of 1om. influence in 
motivating the aal• of firma. further, the relati..ely lov ••curiti .. 
prices preyailina in the atock market created en anviroam.eut conducive 
to the 1atiafactton of tbe1e objectiv••· 
Th• State of Hara•r Theory 
Th• masnJ.tude of merger activity hae been •abject to wide fluc:tua-
tioa.a •tad the foregoS.na anatyaia ba1 attempted to explain why tho•• 
fluctuation., cCllll'DODly termed ''merger movement•," occurred vbeu the1 
did. Yet, between the ot::currencee of merger mOYe.ent• 1C1De "lli.niul•• 
ar "1aorul" level of merger actiV'ity hH been maintained. Thua, it 
appear• that preseuTea are ezertod at all time• on f trma to participate 
in merger• aud that in aane period• condition• eJd.at which are e1pecially 
con.dud•• to meraer activity. Marser theory emi.nea the "nonul" 
preeaure oa firms to grow by merger in•tead of by internal expansion. 
!p!el ot the f&m: goale 
A theory that purport• to exphln the ecODOllic bebanor of 
declaion-aald.ng uuit1 1• nec:e1Hrtl1 built upon acae pretd.ee about 
the goall of dect1ioo-aaku1. FoT eu~le, the pnld.1e of the theory 
of coa1uaer behavior i• that conaUllere act to .. ldmis• 1ati1factton 
(3S, pp. 26-42). Th• theory of pricina and production po1tulat•• 
that fir.• act to .. Jdaia• profit• {3S, pp. 189-297) . Thia 1tud7 
H•ma•• that long-run profit uxilliutioo guide• the fina'• ftdu•or• 
in .. rger activity. 
44 
Th• approach to the theory of the firm adopted by thi1 1tudy 
treat• tbe buai11a1 fina a• an organiutt.on dellgned to implement 
the econaaaic objective• of an iudividual or aroup who are both it• 
owar1 aU<1 11111t1aaer1 (9, p. 238). At the time of Mar1b1 ll, vb en th• 
traditional theory ot th• fit:'ll wa1 fir1t 1yntbeai&ed (51; pp. 323-
.503); ower-aanagecl firu were probably the daainnt form of buaia.e•• 
eat•t1Jri••, in terma of both number• and aa1et control (27, p. 221) . 
In general, the traditional tbeory of th• firm and it• profit ud:ad• 
ation e11umption aeeaed euffidently realistic to explain the 
actual behavior of moat budn••• finaa in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries (27, p. 222). 
In recent year• th~re ha1 eserged a growing d111ati1faction 
v1th tbi1 earlier concept of the bldin••• fin. (91 111 27 1 4S 1SO) . 
The tnditioul theory baa beer:i criticized for the inapplicability 
of it• profit suziaizatiOCl a11Wt.ptlon to the behavior of tit:'lll tu 
which aa:nag .. ent 1• ae,.rate frou owner1htp (27, p. 221 ; 111 pp. 33-37) . 
It 1• held thAat th• tradJ.tloswl th~y f•ib to account for the dJ.ffer-
tna motivea of aanaaera and owuar1 (SO, pp. 185-186) . 
the primary 1ourca of praaent diaaatiafac:tion vltb the tradittooal 
theory 11 th• abift fr• ovnarabip control to uupant cOlltrol of 
corporate ded•lon-mald.na that ha• occurred within the twentieth 
century (9). Though data have not bee compiled oo cbaua•• in the 
dtatr1but1oo of all corporatiou by type of cootrol, mdeoce on 
ehange• in the type of control within the 200 largeat non-financial 
carporat1ona doe• permit, by iDfunce, a generalisation about the 
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extmt of aauag.._t control O.H' all corporate behavior. Th• 1929 
etudy o,f lerl• and Nun• (12) dlecloeed that unagement control eJd.ated 
in 44 percent of the 200 lar1••t non-financial corporationa and ruled 
over 58 percent of the total aaeet• of the 200 corporatlOIUt (12, p. 115). 
Laner'• 1963 •tudy (47) yielded c0111par•ble figta .. of 84 perceot aad 
85 pe.rcen.t (47, p. 7831 Table 2). Clearly, vi.thin tbe larae corpor ... 
tiClll the 1eparation of IUU&elM'Dt aDd OWD.Uabip hal JrOW exteut.vely. 
lvrtber, fraa Bain'• .. tlaat• that the 200 lara••t non-financial 
corporatiana account for 55 percent of all non.financial corporate 
a••eta (7, p. 87), lt may be inferred that the objective• of .. uag•r• 
vbo are not nece••ad.ly owner• guide the use of a large percentage 
of the productive capacity of the Alaerlcan ecoraOllly. 
Whether thi• 1D0Yemeat toward • management-controlled econC11y 
n•ce••itat•• a draatic revialon of the theory of the fira depend• 
OD whether .. uage1111Dt objective• do, in fact, differ .. rkedl7 fra. 
the objectiv .. of C'Wller•. Crit1c1 of the traditional theory argue 
that uuser• de.ire preatlge, power and aalar, (9, p. 248; 50, 
pp. 186-187), and that th••• elet1e11t1 incr .. •• with the •iae of th• 
fln (SO, p. 186). Bence, tbe rational goal of .. n.agera 1• to mad.Ilia• 
growth (SO, p. 188). a. the other hand, if ovaera, •• atoctholder1, 
dealr• to receive the largeat poaaible dividend, their objective 
would be to maJlimize profit• (6,, p. 18). 
The traditional theoTi•t•, e"9tl if they admit the ahortcmai.ega 
of their theory, reuin wicODvinced of the •u~rtortty of a .. ugerial 
theory of the fira (9,35,6S). 1ergua°'1 atate• "• •• tbe a19W1PtiOD 
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ot profit zimiution 1• the only one providillg • aener11l theory of 
firaa, marketa and resource •llocatioo that la aucceaaf\ll both in 
explaining end predictina buaine.a behavior" (35, p. 191). Baldwin 
contend a ". • • that pTofit uximization ta a feirly cloae approxil:ut-
tion to the actual aotlve• of tne typical lara- corporation • • • 0 
(91 P• 254). 
Actually, even if the mao.aaer 'e objective 1• growth unaiu-
tion, it need not conflict with the ovner• a goal of profit aadmiP. 
tion. A8 profit• are the main aource of flDlda for gr~h, the 
r.uudaiaotioo of growth W0"1ld entail the m.axiadaatioo of profit• 
(641 pp. 29-30; 65, p. 11). Releon and Penroee both argue that 
dif ferencea aaon; long- run goall of the fl rm, auch •• gt'owth 
.. xl.miaetion md profit madmiutlon, are largely a choice of worda 
(58, p. 61; 64, p. 30). Jurtber, the policiea of "target retUl"ll 
pric1na" and "•ales maxiaisation" that oatandbly are puraued t.y 
srowth-oriented mauagere may be conaiateut with long•rUD profit 
maxiatz.etion (9, p. 241; 6S 1 p. 12). 
Hodtl of th• f&rm: growth 
Mllraer and intern.al ezpau.lon are the two fora• of fira p:owth. 
The force• that lead to • choice between aerau md internal expanalon 
a• a method of growth can beat be underatood in the context of ftra 
growth it•elf. That la, an inquiry tuto the nature of the arovth 
proceea itself and • recognition of the inducement• for, a1ld reatrainta 
on, fina growth aay facilitate an underatnding about the firm'• 
prefeTence for a aped.fie method of growth. 
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In addition to profit maximiutton, modeh of firm growth usually 
•••m&e that the 1uppliea of capital, labOl' .nd management are not 
fixed and that opportunitlH fo-r profitable inttatrnent• exist aoae-
wbere in the economy (64, p. 43). th• effect oi the~• two aaaump-
tioas 1• to •••ure that the re1ource• required for gt:owth •Te avail-
abl•, if the firm ia willing to pay th• price for tbea, acd that 
there exl•t• a profitable use of the reeou.rcea. 
In firm growth models, the ftni ia ueually conceived of aa a 
pool of productive resource• which i:narusgement allocate• aaong the 
functional activitiu of the fin (SS, p. 61; 64, p. 24). aobinaon 
has categorised the ftrm•a functional activit1.- into five 1'Mljor 
groupa 1 1) technical production activities, 2) rurketing activities, 
3) ~.aagerial activitiea, 4) financial activitie1 and 5) rtak-abaorption 
activities (68, pp. 10-93). Por each functional activity there 11 
an optimUtll (loweat cost) level of the activity, and when all actlvitlee 
are functlOl:dns simaltaueoualy at optiinwa levela, the firm la producing 
at the optiaura fins acale in that the f1m enjoys the lowest avet:age 
total cost of production per wdt (58, p. 61 ; 68, p. 95). 
Management'• task 1• to "reconcile," through resource allocation 
and in aacord.tuce wltb profit aaxtmizatton, tb.e optimal levela of the 
fin'• functional •ctivttie1 in order to achieve the optimum f1m 
•c•l• (,8, p. 64; 64, pp. 67-68). An adjustment of the various optiaa 
of the firm 1• neceaeary bec•uae it le u.nltkely "· •• that all the 
function• of tbe firm ruch their optimwa ai&e at one and the aame 
teal output of product" (68, p. 94). lor example, the optiaum 
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technical productioc unit .t.aht be r•vc••ent~ by X unit• of output, 
vbil• the opt111lU11l 11arketing unit would require that X + 100 unit• of 
outpuc be produced. Thu•, production at 1cale X would not ellov 
marketing econom1H to be fully realised. Stated differently, at a 
1cale ot X+ 100 unite of aatput the marketing activity would contain 
"•xc••• capacity" ('8 1 p. 63) or 0 unwaed resource•" (641 pp. 65-74) 
in that the same amount of aark«tina reaourc.. could be employed ta 
urketing additional product . 
According to Pe:nroae and llar'ler, growth 1• th• reaponae that 
occurs when mana~t atteapta to reaolve the labalancea in the 1cale 
of production that may exi•t among the var1oua optima of tbe ftra 
(581 p . 63; 641 pp. 65-74). In the eZDaple above it would be po.eible 
to utiliee urkettng re•ourcea ... ore fully by incrudoa the aice of 
tbe technical production unit. Thia increaae in aize i• tenned growth. 
Thua, grovtb, •• perce1~ by Harver and Penroae, ie a likely result 
of the exiatence of exceaa capacity or incomplete ut111&atioo of 
reaourcea (581 p. 64; 641 pp. 6S..74). 
Penroee'• theory t•pll•• that growth would cea•e one• exce•• 
capacity diaappeared or complete utilization of reeourcee waa obtained. 
However / several factora act to create exc.eaa capacity at variou• 
t1mee. One eucb factor, 1ntenual to the firm, 1• reaource ind1v1a1-
biltty (64, pp. 68--70). Aaaume, for ezample, that the r••ource• 
required to effect au increase in the •i•• of th• tedmical productiaa 
activity are available only 1n dlatinct, separate unite, and aa1uae, 
abo, that one unit of the technical production reaources would 
49 
inCl'e•ee th• 8ia• of th• technical production activity by 200 UAit• 
of output. Uaing the above illuatration on the imbalance of the 
marketing and technical prodciction optima, it i• apparnt that the 
addition of one \IDJ.t of the technical production l' .. ource re•ult• in 
• level of th• technical production activity which 1• argft', by 100 
unit• of output, t!utu that of the optimwa marketing unit . lxceH 
capacity ha• occarred iu technical production becau•• reaourc•• vere 
not divieibl• to the point lihere juat 100 unit• of output could ba 
added to technical pToduction c•pacit7. Kana~em•nt now ha• au 
incentive to incre.a1e the ecale of it• maTkatiog activiti•• ln order 
to ut1U.•• fully technical production reeourc••· Further, if urbt· 
ina resources are uot completely div1•ible, the oev level of ••rkating 
capacity uy be greater than. that of technical production, amt, once 
more, exceu capad.ty vould ext.et in the urutiug unit. 
Axnong the e~ernel factors cr••tlng •a.c••• capacity are a gr°"" 
in& demand for product•, chana•• in the supply of tnputa, cbaug .. to 
technology and dnelopaent1 in un.aa•ent tec:h:Dique• (64, p. 6.5). 
!ach of the•• factora uy cauae imbalance• a11011g the ••rioua opti• 
of the fil'll and induce growth (85, p. 63). 
There 1• not cot:aplete •ar•aent that a:rowtb mauaaellmlt will be 
terain.ated vbeu reaourc•• are full7 utilised, •• implied by Penro1e'a 
tbeory (10) . la-rtoo argue• that gt'owth •till might occur eva if the 
fina bad arrived at tba opt1aum firm 1cale (10, p. 368) . tegardlea1 
of whetbe-r the tint cantaiued any unuaed reaource1, ezpanaion would 
be J>l'Ofitable if the •ll:Pected urglul rate of profit were areater 
tbau the .. rgioal coat of capital (10, p. 368). 
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U the aHW11ptlan• of the growth model are relaxed / tt may be 
eaen that iu realtt7 obatacl•• to nrowth eJd.•c. 1irat, the raaource• 
of labor, capital and •nageaient u7 QOt be readily available at the 
price the ftrus is vU11ng to pay for them (641 p. 43). Secood, there 
may enat a leek of opportuniU•• for profitable inveatment (64, 
p. 43). To same desree, tbia eacond limit to growth 1• 1.'elatad to 
the factor• conaidered by llMIUgaent a• affecting an inveatlunt •a 
profit potential. for iutanca, aanaaement uy be eoncerned with 
the •rkat competition that uy be fae4d in eqaneloa or with riak 
ad uncertainty iuvolved ia expuaian (641 pp. 43-64) . 
Q[owtb bx mtraet: 
Thi• •tudy aa•um•• that maugeMnt •a choice of the Mtbod of 
fira &rovtb 1• guided by profit 1Uld.aiaatlon. In accordance with 
profit uximisation, 1U1Utg•nt would conaidtt factor• euch •• the 
·~, coat aDd uncertainty of p:ovth •• well •• other factor• 
af f ectina th• profitability of arowth in deterad.nillg the ••tbod of 
fira growth. C!t•r1• peribua, it vould be eapected that manaaemnt 
would prefer 1••• co.tly growth to aore coatly growth, f a1ter growth 
to 1lo.er growth, grovtb Vlth leu uncertainty of 101H to more 
uncertainty and growth with l•H raatl'ainte to more re1traln.ta. th• 
queat1oo becaua, tba, doea aLerger have an advantage oYer internal 
growth with reprd to the abo.e factocat 
Wirat, under certain cOllditioo1 arovth by mers«r !!IX be ••cured 
with l••• acmey outlay by purcha•ins the atock of au exletina ca.pany 
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retber than coo•tructin; the de•ired fecilitiea end birina new pereoanel 
to operate the facil1tie1 (93, p. 74). According to Butter• and Lintner, 
it would be poaeible to obtain aavina• iu money coat if the stock of 
tbe to-be-acquired firm 1• ••llin& below the replacement co•t1 of that 
firm'• ••••t• (17, p. 76). Such a aituation aight &riae if buyer• 
allM1 ••llera of the etock uodereatimate the earning capacity of the 
firia. An addition.al money aaviup may result by b1r1na the acquired 
firm'• p~r•omael at their preeent price• rather than baina forced to 
•uff er the co•t• of recruitina new pereomael and to coapnute the 
recruited peraonnel, a• lli&bt be the ca•• in inteTa.al e>epanalon (64, 
p. 127). 
Secoad, gTowtb by merau aay often be 1&ore quickly accoapl1ab9d 
tb•n 1ntenial growth (931 p. 74). Internal expeaaloo require• that 
ti•• be eJq>ended in the cOD•tructioo of plant• and the eurch for 
pereonnel to operate the facilitie• (SS, p. 70; 64 1 p. 127), vbile 
the plant• and peraonnel are already available in growtb by merger. 
Of couree, a meraer doee coneaae ti•• in locating a fira that fit• 
th• ecquirtaa fira'• needa aad pioina the approval of th• aerglna 
ca.pauiea' •tockhold..r• (60, p. 59), but it ..... unlikely that the 
time involved would be aa areat 88 that ln internal expauiOD. 
l ~eplac.-.aeat cost ie the value of a corporation'• capital aa1et1 
"•• deteraiaed by the coat of replacing equipment wltb nw llOdell ad 
d••lan• capable of performina operatiOlla identical to tboae perfon;ie.d 
by the old equipaent" (1001 p. 276). 
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Third, sroKh by auaer aay be aecompliehed with l•H uncfttainty 
of iaveataent loaa than internal growth (24, p. 23; 41, p . 122) . That 
ia1 th• acquired fin may have already daooatrated it• rneaae-
yiel.din1 capacity, while no auch eenainty about the return from 
inveataent in internal ezpauaiou exiet• (93, p. 74). It uy be 
eqected, however, that the price of such a fin would reflect lt·• 
unina povn, and, hence, it aipst be more p~ofitable to expand 
internally than to purch••• that firm. 
rounh, growth by aaeraer, accompll•hed through an excbana• of 
atock, may be aore eadly tlnanoed than internal growth (64, p. 70). 
the fiunciag of internal grovtb cay require a puhlic aale of the 
firm'• atock. It ia poaeible that own.era of a flra which la a likely 
object of acqu11itloa vould be ~ore willing to accept an acquiring 
firm'• atoc:k in ••)'!Hilt thau would inveator1 in a public Hle of stock 
of the fina contetaplatln& growth (931 p. 74). Such a altuatiou aigbt 
occur if hish•r riak were attached to internal growth. 
littb, gTovth b1 meraer aay avoid the lnteuified co.petition 
that .. , result fl'Olll internal •JEP•n.alou (93, pp. 74-75) . Mlrger, 
UDltke internal growth, does not add capacity to the market and, tbu1, 
avoid• exerting any downward prea1ur• on price• (171 pp. 77-78; 43, 
p . 554) . It the deaire to a-void competition 11 extended further to 
include a drive for m.erkec control, it i• apparent that Mrket control 
••Y be achieved witb l••• effort throuab aftrger than internal e~ 
aion (93, p. 75). 
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CILUTD Ill. STATIMllrl' ~ BIP<ml!SIS 
Int rochactl cm 
A• ateted ln the introductory chapter, the purpoee of thi• etudy 
i• to r•l•t• mov .. euta in •P•clfic economic variable• to th• rete of 
corporete aar&•"Z' in accordeace with the attady' • ceatral hypoth•al• 
that buain .. a, c:apit•l .. rut and arovtb condition• ban influenced 
the rate of corporate aerger la American iunufacturina during the 
period 1951-1966. Huch, if uot all, of the b••i• for thi• ceutral 
byp«haala 11 to be found 111 the aurvey of explanation• of earlier 
l ••ra•r movement• and the exnd.Dation of aerger theory. Specifically, 
the review of explanation• of earlier aerger movement• indicate• that 
period• of riaing merger activity h••• uaually occurred in ti••• of 
2 bu1in•1• proeperity and favoreble financial market1. In eddition, 
ceraer theory augge•t• that large-acele ••raer activity cau be ~ 
pected to develop during period• in vbich condition. ere particulerly 
3 conducive to b\lainHe eJrpmaion. 
A complete atat .. ent of hJPoth••e.a •bout factor• ef f ectina merger 
ectivity would reflect the a«lvation1 of both the aequirtug firm 
and the acquired f 11'11 in aerging. However, the bypothe1ea of thi• 
atudy ere ••t forth flr'Onl the viewpoint of only the acquiring flra. 
Th•t t1, no hypoth••i• ia 1pecific•lly •u&s••ted about the role of t he 
1see pp. 22 .. 43. 
2 
8•• pp. )2-33,36,39-41. 
l See PP• 43-S2. 
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acquired firm' a ia.centivea for aerger in the 1951-1966 merger aovament. 
Sucb la.ceuti vea of the acquired firm may aria• from tax, MUgeaent 
and 1nve•t1141Dt conalderatiODa (181 pp. 368-374). Th••• factor• are 
difficult, although not 1-.poaaible, to quantify for a atatiatic.l 
analy•l•; a deacriptlve analy•1• ha• beea made of their effect• on 
••raer activity (17,18). 
Probably a aore aeriou1 complication than the effect• of aeller 
llOtlvatione in describiua the ti~• pattern of aer geT activity it 
accounting for the interval of time required to effect aerger 
deciaiona. Though tise al•o elapses betveen dectaiona to expand 
inte?"Mlly and the actual internal expandon, the tina.e elemmit 
involved in aerger expaulon la 1omewhat different. Internal expanalon 
may be arranged fairly quickly in that contract awards for plant 
conatruction and order• for machinery ~•y follow closely a firm'• 
deciaion to expand, and, yet, conaiderable time may pas1 before 
plant conatruction 11 complete and the facllltie1 are operable 
(60, P• 59; 61, p . 107). In contreat, the arrangement of •erg.i-1 
con1wH1 ti•• in gainina approval from atockholdeTa of merpng 
companies and authorisation for corporate charter changes from 1t1te 
coallie1ion•, but once the•• barrier• are overcome, the plant 
facilitie1 are immedietely operabl• (601 p. 59; 61, p. 107). 
The reaourc" available for tbia etudy rule out any atte.pt to 
determine the tii:H lag ot ••rger conaUllldtions behind t1erger deci-
11on•1 but an attempt is Gade to take account of possible time lags 
in the r•1pon1e of maT3er actiYity to aovenaeats in 1pecific 
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economic variablea. A lasged reapon•• may occur for at lea•t two 
ru•on•: 1) firm ded.aiaa.-mallen cay not be immediately aware of 
change• ln economic condition• that would ordi'Dllrily be considered 
conducive to gTovth by merger, or, •tated differently, firm deciaioa-
maker• may lack complete or perf act knowledge of environmental cllanaes 
that would be expected to reault in incru•ed mer3er activity• and 
2) fin decialoo-makera, eveu if they poHeH perfect knowledge, i=aay 
re~uire a prolonged aad 1uetained period of condition.a coriaidered 
favorable to growth by merger before embarkina ou merger activity 
ataply to il'l8ure that auch coudltiona are not temporar7. The poa1l-
bi llty of time lag.a •uaseet• that relattooahipa hypotbeaized betveen 
merger activity and the econa.ic variable• be expre•eed in term• of 
unit tlme periods, for example, t 1, t 2, ••• , t 0 • rurther, since 
merger data could be obtained only on an annual baala, it i• nec-
eaur7 to aasUUle a unit time period 11 one year 111 length. 
Pi.nally, limittt reaourcu prevent a caae-by-caae approach to 
the prcbl• of determining the economic euvirOPment conduci•e to 
•eraer activity. While au es.aaination of aergere individually could 
be eqacted to determine particular and immediate factor• affecting 
the ti.mi.DB of •ersara, c••• atud1H of all OJ; even • majority of the 
mergera in the 1951-1966 period would require a large quantity of 
financial and tiiaa reaourcea. If relatively f ev aergera were 
exaaiued, generalisation of findings baaed on a few ca••• would be 
tenuou•. Further, the uae of • caae-by-c••• approach aay blind the 
ruearcher to ... jor econoadc condition.s affectina the entire eco.tc:ny. 
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Therefore, thi~ •tudy adopt1 an aggregate approach to the probl• 
of a•certainina the .. jor econmaic forcee re1pon1tble for, or correlated 
with, the 1951-1966 aerger aoveant. Tbe aaaregate appro.ch uy be 
expected to permit more aeueral applicab111tJ of findlna• than tha 
caae-b)'"'c••• approach. .U pal't of the aggregate approach, hypothHH 
are •tated at both the agaregate aantlfacturiua and tb• individual 
aaa~facturlna industry level1. 
A• ha1 been aoted, variou1 hypotbeaee about the relattoo of 
meraer activity to buain••• and capital market condition• have been 
tested for Che periods co'tering the earlier merger movement• (61 1 
pp. 106-126; 93, pp. 75-81), but tbe1e h7P<1tbe1e1 have remained un-
aud.ned for the 1951-1966 period covering the renn1l of large-
1c.ale aerger activity. The arowtb-meraer hypotbeeu to be 1et forth 
iu tbie atudy have not been teated for any period. If it uy be 
abown that around• eld.1t for buliueH, capital .. rut and growth-
aeraer hypot he1c1, it would aeem appropriate to correlate 1tati1ticelly 
buaiu .. a, capital .. rket and growth condition• to the rate of corporate 
merger in the period 1951-1966. 
In addition to introducina growth c01ld1tiona a1 • poe•ible 
determiuaut of aerier activity, tbia 1tudy ••eke to correlate aerger 
activity to both arowtb and bu1inea1 conditiooa within individual 
iudu1trlea •• well •• vi.thin agaregate mauuf acturing. Previou. 
1tudie1 of t he 1tati1tical relatiooebip1 of merger activity to 
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bU91neH and capital market coad1U.on• ha•H be• confined to the 
•aar•a•t• manufacturtna level. An 1nduatr7 level of aulyeta uy 
provide an underataudiog of mov•ent• iu the lnel of aerger act1nty 
within individual induatriea. 
Finally, the approach of tbia atudy differa frOll that of earlier 
atQdi•• in that accoua.t 1• taken of poeaible laaaed reapona.. of 
mera•T activity to b&lain•••, capital aarket and growth factora. 
larller atudiea have related nerger activity in one U.M period to 
economic condition• in the aaM tiM period, even tboup aneral 
student• bave illclicated that lagged reaponaea aay ex:iat (60,61 1 93). 
The preaat atudy introduce• tiae las• 'Where it ta felt th.at .! priori 
reaaoaing aud the reaulta of previoua atudiea juatify doin.a ao. 
8ua1aeaa cxcl• bzpoth•• .. 
lt haa been noted prnioualy that the three earlier 11er1u 
l80V•eatta occurred durina period. of proaperity. J'u:rther, ltebon'• 
aad Weaton'• coapariaoasof reference cyclea1 with •erger cycl .. iu 
tbe period 1895-19'6 point to a high degree of conformity betveea 
the two (61, pp. 108-116; 931 pp. 77-79). Yet only in the period 
1919-1931 ••• the atatiatical correlation of merger •ctivity to 
tnc:luatrial production poait1vely significant et the S parcent level 
of eipaif1canc• (61, p. 108). Indeed, in cor.-elating aeraer activity 
to induetrial produ.ctioo in the intervar period 1919-1941, Weaton 
1 
Ae ueecl here, reference cycle• denote cycle• in aeneral bU9iaeu 
activity determilled by moveaeut• in econ'*1c aertea, euch •• tuduatrial 
pToductioo and vboleaal• price• (37, pp. 25S..297). 
I 
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arrived at a neaative, tboaab inaiplifi~nt, relation (93, p. 80). 
'lbua1 it appear• that buaia••• condition• have not aarkedly affected 
merger activity at all timH and even may not have conaiatently 
influenced aerier activity in the aame direction at all ti•••· Bence, 
there .. , be a bad• for eqreeaina two oppoains bypotbeau about 
the eff•cta of buaiu .. 1 actlTity on th• rate of corporate merger. 
A firat ''buinea• c7cle" hypotbea1• of aerg.er activity, one 
tbat uy be t•rmed tbe "proaperity" the.ta, 18 tti.t upward movement• 
in buein••• activity are •••od.ated vitb 1ncreaa1na merger activity, 
or, aore pred.aely, • direct aaeoclatton e:d.ate betvea change1 in 
the level of buain••• activity nd cbanaee io the ln•l of aager 
actinty. Thia hypotheda 1• exp~H••d for both aggregate un~ 
facturi.111 alUI ind1'ridual unufacturing indu.triu. 
Tb• reaaontng aupportiaa tba "proapertt7" tbeaia evolve1 fr• 
a c0091deration of the eirailarity of external axpanaion. and lat.real 
expauion aa inve1tment v~uras of the tlrm. Plant coostructioa, 
and new order• for durable equipment, which oc:cur in internal expan· 
•ion, cooatitute investment from both the •taadpoint ot th• firm and 
the economy (931 p. 76). \lbile extemal expansion, or merger, repre-
ant1 Gilly a chause of owner1hip of productive facilitie• alM! la not 
counted •• inve1tment for the ecocoaay a• a whole (931 p. 76), the 
acquisition of a firm i• an •ct of ioveataent OD the part of the 
aequirina firm not dissimilar to the inveatulent ln baterual expauion. 
For Doth typea Of iUVUtaent I fib decit1iOO..W11tera llUlt weigh the 
coat• of expanaion against the expected future earnings of expanaion 
(61, p. 106). 
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If iuternal eqandon ructa poaiti••ly to the buaineH cycle, it 
may be expected that enerul expanlion would beban likewise. In 
fact, internal expanaion, a• indicated by pt.nt con1truction and aev 
ordera for durable equipiaent, apparently iucr .. 1ea •• the le.el of 
buain••• activity ri••• (60, pp. 56-59; 93, p. 76). Tbue, the 
alailarity of intemal expandon and aerger aa act1 of investment 
augge1t1 that • direct relation .. Y ext.at between challg•• ln the 
level of bualneae activity and cbana•• in the level of aerger activity. 
A aecond ''buainaes cycle,. bypothuia offered by thi• atudy h 
that cyclical downturn• in bueine11 activity are aaaociated with ln-
cr .. 1e1 ln aerger activity, or there 1• an inveraa relation between 
cbnigu in the ln-el of merger activity and chngH in the level of 
buinua activity. Thia "receelion" thelia 11 ••••rted for both 
•urea.ate aauutacturing and individual unutacturlng indu.atrie1. 
The ttreceaaion" tbeai1 obtain.a it• eupport from tvo ai11,ple 
f actor1 that may have 1pecial impoTtance in period• of receding 
bu1ineaa activity. Oateu.ibly, during a receaaion firm.a would be 
eapecielly moti•ated to pre1erve profit• by either increaain& 
revenuH or lovering coata. Acquiaitiona of otbu lira• would be 
expected to rai•• revenuea and, to tbe extent that ecouci.iea of 
operatiom would l'eeult, lower coat1 alao (591 p. 62; 93, p. 80). 
ror both "huaineaa cycle" bypothes~•, it ia aaamaed that chanaaa 
in the level of aergel:' activity in a tlme period are related to 
change1 in buaine•• cond1t10118 in the imaediatel7 preceding time 
period. That 1• 1 there ia • one year legged respoaae of changee in 
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meraer activity to changes in buaine11 activity. la hil study of the 
cODforaity of merger cycle• to ref eTence cycles between 1920 •lld 1938, 
Weaton found that merger cycle peaks, on the •••rage, legjed behind 
reference cycle peaka by ebout one qwarter of • year and that trough• 
io. merger activity trailed reference cycle trouah• by four qwartera, 
or one year (93, p. 17). Since only annual merger data are available 
and, tbua, require that time laga be expre1aed in discrete units of 
one year, a lagged reaponae of one year would aeea epproprute. If, 
•• .. lion ausaeata, a prolonged period of prosperity ia neceaaary 
to convince firms that the time 11 ripe for e,,qaa11.Sion (61, p. 111), 
and a len.gthy period of recHaion h required to m.10 firma peHi· 
miatic, tbe aaaum.ed one-yur laa may not be unreallatic. 
!be aurvey of uplanationa of .. rlier merger 1110Veiunta illdicated 
that the capital market 1erved •• a •edium by which tb• aecurttiea 
of large couolldatioo• could be aarbted and by vbich promotional 
l profit• of conaolidationa could be obtained. While an inveatlgation 
of the importance of th••• two factora in the cur-rent aerier acw•ent 
ta beyonct the acope of thi• atudy, the atudy do.• could er hov condi· 
t10D1 in the 1tock JUrket .. y have otherwi•• influenced merge~ 
activity 1n the period 19Sl·l966. 
Other effects of capital marit.t couditioaa on meraer activity 
n·i•• in the f inaneina of 111•rsera. Acquilitiona are pd.mart ly 
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financed in one of four vaya: 1) 01e of the acquirina ftl"lll'• internal 
caah fUDdli 2) 1ale of acqairer'• 1tock; 3) exch•n•• of the acquirer'• 
atock for the acquired fil"lll' 1 atock; and 4) borrowing of caab fuad• 
(84, pp. 94-101). ODly the 1econd1 third and fourth method• are 
ln.olved in the d11cu1aion here. A• well •• reflectina the riak and 
uncertainty attached to any inveatmeot, the coat of borrovt.ag reflect• 
the opportunity coat of tbe ue of internal ceab fund1, •• in 1), and 
thus the diacuaeion oa borrowing H a mean• of financing acquiaitiOlll 
would appear applicable to the firat metbod of flnancina acqui1itioo1. 
'flgo 1u1ae1tiona have been offered about the aauner in which 
coa.dition1 in the atock market may affect the fiaanctna of •eraer1, 
eithH by new atock iaauea OT by exch•nae of atock between the aergisag 
coaapaui••· lelaon aakea the following hypothe1i1c 
Hr.a expaQdtna by meraer, •• in other toraa of firm 
arovtb 1 frequently tuna to public: aourcea fOI" the needed 
eatr• funda. ... capit•l h•u•a are mo.t cOllllOD when the 
acquired finu are purchaaed for c.11b; but vben the 
pureb••• i• .. de by •zcbanae of •tock, new ••curiti•• are 
frequently ieaued to 1acruae working c•pital. hn vhn 
a pure atocar...for-atock transaction 11 made, the oraautaara 
of the ••rau are eenlitive to tbe recent trend of the 
1tock urket 1 'becau•• ratio• of •xch••a• are partly 
determined by the market price• of the aecuritiea of tba 
merging flraa . We might expect to find .. rgua occurbaa --
•• with other aapecta of corporate financina -- when the 
re~t biatory of atock pric•• baa tudlcated a atrong 
tendency tov•rd further incr•••• (611 p. 107). 
rroaa th• acquirina ftra•1 vtewpoint the ratio of ezchalla• of 
atock becoaaea 11ore fa.orable •• the sn:ic• of it• atock ri••• relati"I• 
to the price of the to-be-acquired fira'a •tock. UnleH •oveaenta 
in the pricH of the two atoc:b ere 1adependent of Neb other, bovner, 
it re11111ina unclear vby rtaina 1tock prlcea would affect the atoc:k of 
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the acquiring ftra more than that of tbe acquired firm. Yet • thr1.tna 
atock .. rket would appear coa.ducive to new atock ieeuee, either to 
lucre••• working ca9ital or to f 1nance the caeb purcha•• of another 
fix-a. That 1•, a rieing d ... ud for aecuritiea, •• reflected by 
rieing etock price•, could be expected to in1ure a market for new 
atock 1Huea. 
Condition• in the •tock market •7 abo exert au iuflunce on 
l aeYa•r ectivit7 by affectina the etock-earuina• ratio• of varioue 
cam.pant•• (52, pp. 79-80) . During a period of rieina atock pricea, 
the price• of the stock.a of ctttain fima, aided by public epeculaU.on aud 
optimiatic projected urnina• report•, aay incruee far beJOlld levela 
1Mrrauted by actual pro1pective earnina• (521 pp. 79-80) . Aa a 
reeult the atoc• earnina• ratio of th••• firsne •Y rlae conalderably 
ab~• tbat of other fir1111 (52, pp. 79-80). Ceter1• par1bua, firaa in 
the former group would be motivated to acquire firaa in the latter 
arou~ for tb• purely flnanclal reaeon that the acquieition would 
increaae the earuinga and ••••ts per share of tbe acquiring finu 
(52, pp. 79-80). In turn, the laproved (lower) atock-e•ruing• ratio 
of the ecqu.irins firm• vould be expected to faclUtat• further price 
riaea in their ato~ka. 
Thus, the improved m•rket•bility of n.v iaauee of aecuritiee and 
the diaparitiea in the etock..-earnin3• ratio• of variou1 firms which 
17be atoc~ ee.rniuga ratio 11 obtained by di vidin& the mer at 
value of a firm'• atock by the e.aruf.nga of the firm. 
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both may develop during a thriving atock urket au.ggeet the followi11g 
bypothe•l•t change• in the le.el of merger activity are directly 
aaaociated with chans•• in the level of atock price•. Since data on 
etoc.k prices have not been compiled by 1nduatry, the hypQtb••i• 1• 
expreaeed 011ly at the aggregate unuhcturtun level . 
The supply of loanable fund• conatitutea an additional •ource 
of capital required to ftnaoce meraera. Often firm• flunca acquiai· 
tion• of the atock or aaaet• of other firms by borrowing c••h f roa 
bauka, i11aurance compani•• and other financial inatitution• (84, pp. 99--
100) . 0.tenaibly 1 tbe amount of fund a borrowed for iuveatment purpoaea 
would vary indirectly with tbe coat of borrowing, or, primarily, the 
iaterect rate. Thu.e, a 1ecoud c.tpital market bypotheai• of thi• atudy 
i• that change• in the level of merger activity vary inveraely wi~b 
the level of intereat ratee . A• vitb the etock market-merger bypotbeeia, 
tbia bypotbeli• ia expreased only for anaregate 1U11uf acturing. 
ror both capital market bypotheae1, lt i• assumed that change• 1.n 
merger acti'Yity in oue time period are rebted to cbaogea in 1tock 
prices •nd lnt«Y••t r•tea in the ••ae tiae period. That is, there 
i• no time lag in the reapon1e of merser activity to capital market 
con4ttions. In compAriug aeraer cycl•• with etock price cycle• over 
the period 1899-1949, ••luoo found that both peab and troughs in 
••ch vere closely related tim ... \111e (61, p. 114). While treuda in 
atock price• and illtereat rat•• .. , enter into the deciaion-.. ker'• 
ccmalderation of growth by aerger, the ratio• of exchange, a1 detel'llined 
by the 1tock price• of the ••rains ftrma, and the level of 1ntereat 
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rate• at or near the propoeed time of the cOD•umm.ttion of mergera, 
ultimately iQf lunace the coat of fiuanclng merger•. If the price 
of the acquirlug fina'• •tock fella markedly or the price of the 
to-be-acquired fi~'• atock inor .. ••• aubetantially prior to the 
propoaed time of cooaummation, the aterg•r m.ay be cancelled (13, p. 1). 
Further, •• acquiring fil"ID9 would not likely borrow fund• for ac~uiei­
tiona until near the p-ropo•ed time of cooaUDUUtiOD, a auirked lncrea•• 
io intareat rate• prior to that time might curtail aany acqui•ition 
plan•. Tbua, it would teem that firm decialon-maker• would be more 
concerned with the level of 1tock pricu and inter••t rate• at or near 
th• propoaed time of mers•r than at any time before. 
c;retb bnotbs•H 
a.uuae merger 11 O'fte of the two priury 1Hthoda of firm growth, 
it ma7 be el!pected that c:on.ditiona aff ectlng the profitability of 
growth aay affect aerier activity also. Aaona the variable• 'tibich 
determiue the proapecta for growth are the level of demand and the 
level of earnings (39). Tb••• ere alao variable• which epecifically 
ntH' into many firiu' evalution• of candidate• for acqui•ition 
(4, p. 108). 
Oort'• atudy ( 3 9 ) of the diverliftcation pattern• of 111 fim1 
in tbe 1929-1954 period indtc:A1tea that trend• in demand and earninga 
lneb ... , •ftect g.rovtb pattern.a in tvo .. ,.. riret, it w•• found 
that the ftrae en.tered induatriu with ar•ater ratea of incruae tn 
d ... nd and earuf.np leveb far mQre often than tnduatriH with euller 
rat•• of increaae ln deaand and earn.inga level• (39, p. 41). 
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Secoud, decrease• or eaall rate• of iocru•e in the demand and earnlria• 
levels of the iudu.striea 111 which the Uru prioclp•lly produced 
tended to exert a polltive influence on their exp1ulou into other 
iod~•triea (39, p. 6) . Th• two finding• indicate that both lncrua1og 
and declining demand ind unilnaa level• m1y eocour•i• buatne•• eJt-
peaiou, or a.rowth. 
Thua, there are gTounda for offering two opposlna bypotbeaea 
about the influertce of growth conditions on aergeT activity. Tb• 
f irat growth bypothul• i a that ch1n1H in the lwel of aerger 
activity vary directly vith cbangea io the level• of d ... ud and 
earuioga. A aecODd gl'ovth bypotheata la that change• in the level 
of aergar activity vary lnveraely with change• ln the lev•l• of demeud 
and eal"Ding•. 
lotb of the oppoalng growth hJPoth•••• are expreaaed at the 
agregate manufacturing lnel and the individual m.auut.cturlna ind1.11tr7 
l l..,el, and both 1a1ume that change• in •erger activity in oue time 
period ar• related to chaugea in dt!IU.Dd and earning• levela in the 
illlJRediately precedina time period. It 11 likel7 that a laggtd re1pon1e 
doea enat aioiply becau•• fira deci1ion-uk.era may not be imaedi1tel7 
avare of trend• in demaad and earninga level•. 
1rne~bly, trend• to d ... Dd and urll1n11 levell lo the induatry 
of the acq~red firm •• ,,.u H tbe indu•try of the acquirtaa fira 
would be relevant in lndtcattaa the po11tbilitlea for growth. However, 
bacauae •erger data are available by lndu.try of only the acquiring 
f trw, the arowth bypoth•••• at the 1nd"9try level are expre11ed 
aolely from the nevpoint of the acquirt•a ftra. That b 1 tbe hypoth-
.... 1tate that the le.el of an lndu1try'1 merger activity varie• either 
directly or inver1ely with tbe iadu•tr7'1 demand and earnin&• levels. 
66 
CBAPTU IV. DATA Aim HETBCI> 
Data 
The hypotbeau of tbe present study are confined to the manu-
facturing f ector of the economy and have been eet forth at the aggre-
gate mnufacturing leYe1 and , in most inatncea, the individual ua~ 
facturing iadus~ry level. Definiti0111 of aggregate manufacturing 
and individual satan.ufacturing iadu.trie1 are takell from the Standard 
Induatrial Claaaificatiop. Mancial (82) . Manufacturing establishments 
include "tboae engaged in the mechanical or chemf.cal transformation 
of o"l'pnic or irun:ganic aubatancea into new products and 11au.ally 
described a1 planta, factories or milla, which characteristically 
uae power driven machine• and materials handling eq&:dpment" (82, 
P• 43)e 
The manufacturing diviaion of econoad.c actlvtty a1 a whole 
contaim five aubdividona: 1) 20 two-digit major induat1ry gToups; 
2) three-digit industry gToupa u1d11g up each two-digit group; 3) 
four-digit induat~i•• cocipri•ing ~•ch three-disJ.t indu•try group; 
4) five-digit product claaaea entering into each four-digit industry; 
S) •ix-digit product.JI making up each product class (82, PP~ 43-121)~ 
AA illustration of ~he aubd1viaions follow• in Figure 4~1@ 
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Becauaa lt wa• not pouible to obtain merger data for aub-
divia1on• below the twe>-d1g1t level, th1• 1tudy coa11dera the indi• 
vidwil aanufactarins induatry •• OD• of the 20 two-digit aajor 
induatry &roupa . Aaar•a•t• 11a11ufactur1ng repTe1ent1 • cOlllbinatioa 
of the 20 major lnduatry groupa. 
Standard ladu1trial 
ct.11ification coda 
20 
201 
2011 
20111 
201111 
Hlljor iDduatry group 
Indu1tr7 group 
Indu.atry 
Product cl••• 
Product 
rood nd kindred product• 
Meat ps-oduct • 
Kut packing 
rreab beef 
Whole care••• beel 
Jigure 4.1. llluatration of atandard ir:aduatrial cl•••ificatloa of 
ecoaoiaic activity 8 
8 Source: (82). 
rurtber, bec..uae only annual d•t• on raerau activity could be 
obtained, it i• uec••••ry to 1xpr111 data on the level1 of buain••• 
activity, atock pric••• lntereat ratea, demand and earniug1 on an 
annual baal1. 
Mlaaurea of ••rge~ act1ytty 
'l'h• mapitude of ••raer activity for any paiod aay be depicted 
by either the number of acquired fira1 or the dollar value of Haetl 
of acquired finu. Since the latter au1ur1 could not be acquired, 
it i• nec•H•ry to u1e the fonter ••aaure. The lur .. u of lcouomic• 
of the federal Trade CGallliaaioo (83) 11 the aource of the 11Ullber of 
fil'IU acquired amwally in •uregate manufacturing aud each of the 
20 "lnduatri .... durtna the period 1951-1966. 
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Mie••ure• of bualpe1a 9ondttiona 
The federal ••••rv• index of induatrt•l productiOD (79) and 
the Bureau of Labor Statiatic• index of vhole1ale price• (80) are 
the two aea1ure1 of the level of bu.ain••• activity employed in tbia 
1tUd7. Each ••••ur• i• available auually during the period 1950-
196.51 for aggrept• manufacturing and each of the 20 "lnduatriea." 
H!!•urea of gi;owth condition• 
The muaure of the level of deund in thie study ls the level 
of value aclded1 taken from the Annual Survey of M8nufacture1 (81) 1 
and adju1ted fo~ price chana••· Wbil• value of 1hipaent1 represent• 
an alternative indicator of the level of d ... nd, value added figure• 
avoid the duplication in the value of 1hipmenta figure which re1ult1 
from the use of product• of aome eatablbbmenta u materiall by 
otbera (81). The level of earning• 1• depicted by the rate of 
return on atockholdua• equity after taxea, taken from the Quart•rlx 
l'lp!pcial !!mt for Man!fftcturing CorJ?oration• (86) . loth ... 1urea 
are nailable oa an auual bast.a durina the period 1950-1965 for 
•aar•aat• manufacturing and .. ch of th• 20 "indu1triu. " 
l.rha hJPoth•••• atate that cbanaea in merger activity in one 
tiae period are related to changee in buaiAu• and gTovth conditiona 
ill the illlllediately preceding ti .. period. Therefore, cb•na•• in 
merger activity in the period 1951-1966 are compared to chanaee in 
bualn••• and arowtb condition• in the period 1950-1965. 
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Meaeurea of capital .. rket conditiona 
Standard an4 Poor'• coamoa indu1trial etock price :lad.ex (83) i• 
choaa •• the aeaaure of the level of atock prtcH io preference to 
the Dow-.Janea cOIUIOD induetr:lal 1tock price ind.ea (83) becaue• tbe 
former 1• baaed on 42.5 etocu and the latter on 30 etocu. '?be 
level ot iuteraat rate• i• mea1ured by Moody'• averaa• of yield• 
on Au corporate baada (56). Olteneibly, the yield tbat m.uat be 
paid on 'bonda may be cOll8ideTed a1 a "kind" of intereat rate or coat 
of inve1tment funda. loth aea1ure1 are obtained allllWllly for the 
1951· 1966 period and enter into tHt• of hypotbea .. at the aggregate 
...... J!otation 
lotation of the variable• depicting meraer activity and bualneaa, 
capital market and growth conditt.ona b •• follow : 
~- number of firm• acquired in perlod t; 
~- level of induatrial production in period t; 
~-t level of wholeeale prices in period ti 
i: • level of profit rate• (ratH of return) in period t; 
<· l•••l of value added in period t; 
~- level of atock price1 in period t i 
x: - level of boad yields in period t. 
A8 the bypotheaea of the preaesit 1tudy 1eek to explain the rate 
of corporate m•raer ln the period 1951-1966 and not the actual level 
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of merger •ctivity, it l• n.ece•••l'Y to compare percentage cb•nse• in 
the level of cerger activity (Mt) to percntage ch•nt•• in the level• 
of variable• i; through <· ~ation.ally, annual percelltage cha11gea 
in l\i Z: and X: for the period 1951-1966 and ln x!1 x!, ~ •nd ~ 
fen- the period 1950-1965 vere computed •• follow: 
~I\ - <'\:-"t-1>/l\.1 ; 
-~ • <~-x!.1>/x~-1; 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • 
Htthod and Model 
ID notatioul fora the bypotbea1&ed relatiouhip• of the etudy, 
togetbft' wltb the 1.vel at vblcb each are etated, are aumuciaed ln 
Table ~.l. 
Table 5.1. Hypothesised relatioPships by level of a1U1lyai1 
Variable Bypothea1zed relation Variable Level of anal7ai1 
"t Positive and negative ·x!-1 Aggregate manuf acturlug and indl.S.dual iuduatry 
Positive end negative 
2 
Aggresat• .. nutacturing "J\ ;\Kt-1 and individual 1oduetry 
11 \ Po•itive and negative "'~-1 Aggregate manufacturing and individual iodutry 
~ t\: Positive and negative 4 Aagregate .. nutacturing ·zt-1 
aDd individual indu•try 
ti~ loait1ve t~ Aggi;egate aanuf acturtna 
~1\ kgative ·< Aasr•aate 11U1nu.f acturing 
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Tbe atatiatical procedure adoptad to examine the relatlon.hip in 
Table 4.1 i• multiple regre111on and corTelation analy•i• (62, pp. 1S9-
243; 1S, pp. 277-301). To the extent tbat any cauae-and-effect 
relat1oneh1p, u in regreHlon, may be ••id to exiat between chans•• 
in buaineea, capital market and arowth condition• and chan1e1 in 
merger activity, A~ lllA)' be coneidered the 11dependent" variable in 
the regreaaion aodel, and 6X:-. 1, fix;_ 1, 6X:_ 1, b.<_ 1, 6~ and tiX: •1 
be teraed the .. independent" •ariable1. 
The multiple resreaaion model• to be 1et f ortb here •••um• that 
tbe indepeadmt variable• are meaaured without error aud that the 
dependent variable reapond1 linearly to the independat variable• 
(75, pp. 164-165) . The adequacy of the form of the linear aodel1 .. Y 
be indicated by the de1r•• of intercorrelatioa. (multicolliaearity) 
amaa.a tbe iadepadeut vartablu (341 p . 100) and the Durbio--Wataon 
tut atatiatic for aerial conelatioa. (28). If two iudependent 
variable• a7:• cloaely correlated with Heh other, one 1a undoubtedly 
redundant (34, p. 100). Further,, if •ei·ial correlation appear• to 
•xi•t, there .. Y be one or saore other perti11ent v•ri•bl .. which help 
to explaiu the behavior of tbe depcdnt variable (341 p. 100). 
Thu1, the preaenc• of aerial correlation a11d multicollinearity call 
for rmaioaa of the form of the regTeelion model. 
leca"8• data lialtation• prevent a •tat1•t1cal analy•i• of all 
ol the hypothHlsed relation.hip• at l!be indu•try level, it ie 11ec-
eaaary to aubmit different re&J.'eHton modeu for the levele of 
•aar•aate unufac:turing and individual induatr1ee. 
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bgreHion Modal I, for each of the 20 Af.nduatri••" 11 as follow•: 
2 e .... 11 (o, o ). (4.1) 
The regrea1ioa equation eatimaU.ng Nodal I teke• the followius 
form: 
ValuM of the partial r•ar•••ion coefficient•, or th• b'• (75, 
pp. 287-301) 1 aultiple correlation coefficient (751 pp. 287-301) aad 
r-ratiot1 (751 pp. 287-301) raaultiag fi-om tHt• of the bypotheau for 
aacb of tha 20 "induatriea" are found 111 Table S.l in Chapter V. 
&egreaaion Koflel II, for aggregate aanufacturiug, i• •• follovei 
(4.3) 
'lh• r•are••ioo equaticm Htlaating Model Il take a the f ollOWiua 
fozms 
(4.4) 
Value• of the partial regreesiOD coefficients, aulttple correla~ 
tion coefficient alld P-ratio reaultiog from teats of the hypotheeaa 
at the a&aregate caauufacturina level are found in Tabl~ S.2 in 
Chapter v. 
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CBAPr!I. V. US11LTS A1CD CCllCUlSlQIS 
J1Ddinge at the Induatry Level 
l.earHaion and correlation •nal1d• of time aeriH data of M\ 
for the period 1951-1966 and of ~x!-l (1 • 1,2,3,4) for the period 
1 1950-1965 produced the re•ult• found in Table 5. 1 on page 74• A• 
may be noted from Table S. l, none of the multiple correlation 
coefficient• (I.' •) was •ignificant at tbe S percasit level. Since 
2 a repreaente th• percentage of variation in the dependent variable 
•••ociated with ••riation in the independent variable• (75, p. 1S7), 
the iudependnt variable• included in reareuion iaodel I, or Equa-
tion 4. 1, would appear to be uniaportant in explalniog variation 
in A~, or th• rate of aeraer, during t he 1951-1966 period . 
The hypothesi• wderlyiug the eig:Dificance teete of the F-
ratio• i• that the partial rear•••ioa coefficieata {b 1 1) do not 
differ from each otbeT •Dd from sero (62, p. 187). A• all r-r•tio• 
at the iuduatry level were insigaiUcant at the S percent level, 
the influnce of the independent vartablH on 61\ would appear not 
to depart a1p1ficantly fl'om ach other and from zero. 
The partial regr .. •ion coetf iciMit of a apectfic independent 
••riable pr ovides the cbaua• in the dependent variable a1aociated 
1while TaluH of correlation between the i.Adependnt variablH 
are uot pYovided iu Table S.l, the te1t for 1ertal correlation 
yielded negative re•ulte, and multicollinearity did not appear to 
be 1erioua. 
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Table .5.1. Teat reault• of model I 
farti•l r•ar•••ioa •ltlpl• correlation 
Standard ioduatrial coeffte&enta coef fic!nt• 
bl b2 1>3 b4 claeeification code I. F•retio 
20 -3.6 1.8 -0 • .5 1.S 0.42 o.ss 
21 -o.s .. 0.2 -0.8 -o.o 0.61 1 • .50 
22 6.S -4. 9 0.2 -1.0 0.47 0.70 
23 1.6 2.2 -0.1 -2.6 0.3S 0.35 
24 6.0 -8.3 1.7 16.0 0.62 1.56 
25 9.2 -3.6 0.2 -10. 7 0.67 2.10 
26 •8.2 1.6 2.6 -o.s 0.48 0.7S 
27 33.7 --· -1.6 -28.4 0.4.5 0.95 28 -0.1 -0.3 -o.s -0.4 0.49 o.eo 
29 14.6 -1 . 1 2.9 -6.9 0.49 0.78 
30 0 .6 -1.s 1.1 1.9 0.53 1.00 
31 -24.2 -3.8 -0.8 3.2 0.68 2.l, 
32 -4.4* 4.3 -0.6 s.o o.65 1.80 
33 -3.l -o.8 o.s 2.8 0.54 1.05 
34 -o.s 1.4 -o.4 2.1 o.3o 0.24 
35 -2.S -1.0 -o. 7 2.6 0.63 1.67 
36 -0.1 -1.S 0.5 -4.9 0.60 1.44 
37 -1.4 2.2 -0.1 0.3 0.42 0.54 
38 -1.2 --· -0.2 -0.1 o.2s 0.24 39 -6.0 9.9 2.1 4.2 0.40 o.48 
•A eaaure of ~~ va1 unavailable for the tvo--d1&1t toduatriee 
27 end 38. 
*V'elu• i• aignificaat et the S perceut level. 
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with • unit change in the independent variable when all other v•riablee 
•r• fixed (7S, pp. 279-281). Other than b
1 
in major 1Ddu1try sroup 32, 
the indu.atry partial regr .. .toa coefficient• were not dpifluut at 
th• S percent level, indicatiag that ~ vaa not altered •i8Jlificmntly 
when the leval of any of the other v•r1ablu w•• cbaased. 
The•• f lndinga do not warra1tt ecc•ptance of ''bueiDH• c1cl•" aud 
growth h1J>Oth•••• of th• rate of corporate ••raer at the indu.etry 
1..-el iD the period 1951-1966. That ia, the data do not 1upport 
either the negative ol!' poaitiv• reletionahip hypotbHiaed between 
chna .. lu bu.sin_eaa and growth condition• and the rate of aera•"' 
vltbia individual lndoatri••· 
Howe••r, for at leaat two ru1ona, the hypothaeu •re not 
uece1Nril1 refuted. llrat, depictiug the upi.tude of •eraer 
activity by the total n.umJ,er of acquired firm• inatud of by dollar 
value of th• tctal a11et1 of acquired fir1H may provide au tuccurate 
vtn of aovementa in merger activity. Wbila the number of acquired 
firm• may change little from one period to another, the value of the 
•••.t• of the acquired firaa may chanae conaiderably due to .. rked 
change• in the at••• of the acquired fir.it. It 1• cooc•lvable that 
the dollar aeaaure ot merger activity i• aore reepOD.8ive to ch.an&•• 
in bu.eln••• cd arowth conditioue than la the numerical .. a1ure. 
4 ••cond qu.altfication of the reliability of the f 1adiuga deal• 
with the concept of •D iudu1try employed in te1ta of hypothe••• at 
the 1Aduatry level. Aa vaa illuatrated by lipare 4.1, each tvo-dlai.t 
ujor induatry aroup ia cc.poa«l of four funher 1ubdivil1.0lla. 
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Probably, the four-digit cl•••1f1cation corre•pond• aore cloaely to 
the economic caacept of an induatry than any of the other claaeifica-
tiooa. n 1a poaaible that merger activity 18 aaaociated to a greater 
extent with buainesa and growth coudition• et the four-digit level 
than at the two-digit level. In th• proc••• of assr•i.ttlns chana•• 
in the variable• frca the four dlgit level to the tvo-digit level, 
the reapon..sea of merger activity to buain••• and gTowtb condition• 
may be offtetting arut, aa a r••ult, no r••Pon•e le noted. at the 
aggregate, or two-digit 111.duatry level. 
A• ta.dtcated in the data ••ctf.oa of Chapter IV, it va• not 
po•aible to obtain either the dollar a.a•ur• of aerger activity by 
indu.try OT raerger data for any induatry level more refined than. that 
of tbe tvo-diait tnduatry level. Therefore, thi• study vaa unable 
to eliminate the two afore-mentioned liaitationa of the data •ployed 
to te•t the bypotbeeee pre1ented in the 1tud7. 
However, data aore reliable than that of thi• atudy do eziat a1 
the Federal Trade Caamiaaion h•• recorded al.Jlott ell aerau• ia 'Which 
the firat invol•ed are lar1er thaD $1 million iu ••••t•. It acceaa 
to tbe Federal Trade Comd.aaion'• files could be obtained, an 
axh.au•tive reaearch of the ll•t• of recorded mergar1 may allow • 
dollar mee1ure to be attached to the m.apitude of merga't° acU.vity nd 
aay permit uch meraer to be aHlgned to tbe f our-dialt industry of 
both acquiring firm and acquired firm. 17 relating tbeae d•t• to 
u:11ting au1ure1 of budneH a.n.d grovtb condition• at the four-digit 
induatry level~ more meaningful testa of hypotheau of •ft'ger activity 
at tbe 1nduatry lrr•l .. 7 re•ult. 
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An additional data limitation of the atudy reaulted from tbe lack 
of a euitabl• Qeaaure of capital m.a~ket cooditiou• at th• indaetry 
level. Haaaure• of either atock price.a or the aupply price of n.w 
capital have yet to be com.piled fen: the individual tnduatry. Thue, 
the etudy va1 unable to aacertain the influence of condition• 1.a the 
capital market on meraer activity within individual 1nduatr1ee. 
AddtU.oual reaearch ~ould p~ovide meaaurea of capital markec concli· 
tione and permit the capital mark.et hypotbesia of ••rger acti.tty 
to be teated at the tnduatry level. 
bgru8ion aud correlation aulyaia of 61\ 1 i\i: 1 Z: for the 
pertod 1951-1966 and of tiX:.1 (i • 1,2,31 4) for the period 1950-1965 
yielded the reeulta found ln Table S.2 oa page 78. The eiplific:ance 
of the multiple correlation coef fic1enta at the 1 percent level lQCli-
catH that rel].'eaaion model 11, or Equation 4.31 ap~ara to ecabody 
the .. jor economic factors aaeociated with the rate of corporate 
merger in American manufacturina during the period 1951-1966. 
Purther, the aianific:ance of tbe 1•ratio at the 5 percent level 
•uaa••t• that certain, if not all, of the partial regr .. aian coeffi-
eict1 differed frora ••ch other and from &ero. That 11, it vould 
appear that caovemeiita in certaio of the ••riabl•• depictina buainee•, 
capital urket and p-ovth COlldition• vu• liplficautly aaaociated 
with 110Vemeu-ta in th• level of raeraer activity in •aar•aat• man• 
facturing during the per10d 1951-1966. 
Table S.2. Tut raalt1 of aodell II, Ila, Ilb, llc a"Dd lU 
Model 
Statiatic 11 lla lib nc lid 
b. -3.7S -1.39 -1.42 -2.10 -3.99 l (-1.85)* (-2.28)ff (-2.28)** (-1.43) (-2.19)• 
b2 1.87 0.81 2.20 
(1.19) (0.74) (1.58) 
bl -o.24 
(-0.67) 
b4 2.87 0.12 2.57 
(1.46) (0.53) (1.49) 
b5 0.95 0.92 0.94 o.90 0.91 
(3.57)*** (J.72)*** (3. 71)*** (3.51)*** (0.24) .... 
b6 0.20 
(0.43) 
~ 0.8887*** 0 .8438M* 0.8520*M 0.8481*** 0.8807ff* a o.8445*** 0.8289*** 0.8266*** 0 .8149*** o.8463*** 
r 5.0086• 14.83SS*** 9.7092*** 9.3955*** 8.6390 ... 
8r1gure1 iu parnthuea below the partial reare11lon coeftld.enta are their t-valuea. 
bt la a adjusted for dep:eea of freedOlll a1Ml may be ued •• a ba•i• for comparing the adequacy 
of fora of ·99rioua regreHiClll aodela tavol-dng 1ub1et1 of vartablea in an origiul regreHiClll •od•l 
(72, pp. 444-445). 
-Val~• i• aigaificant at the 10 percent l9Yel. 
**Value l• aipdficant at the S percent leyel. 
***Value ta eigoilicant at the 1 pacat i ... 1. 
..... 
C» 
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T-te•t• of the partial regreHioo coefft.cienta 1bov, however, 
that only b5 va• 1lplficant beyoad the 5 percnt level. Stated 
d1fferentl7, of the variable• included in model II, only chaaa•• 
lu the level of atock price• appear to have been aa1oc1ated with 
tbe rate of merger. In addttlcm, the extremely low t-valu~ of b3 
end b6 1ad1cate that movement• in eal"Diuaa and iutere1t rate level• 
had little, if any, a••ociatton with the rate of merger, while the 
auch higher t-valuaa of b1, h2 and b4 point to • more aignificant 
aaaociatloo. of tbe rate of aerier with bu.in••• condltioa.. and 
ehaugea in deuDd. Thua, the rate of aerger durina the period 19~1-
1966 would .... to have been more cloaely allped with chana•• in 
the level• of induatrial production <z!>, vbole1ale price• <X:>, 
demand <X:> and •tock pi-iee• <Z:> than with the lnela of earuinga 
(~) and lntereat ratea (i:). 
In accordnce with tbi• finding, aodel 11 va• teated in four 
reduced fora iilvolnna 6X: (1 • 1,%,4,S). Teats of reduced models 
Ila, Ilb, Ile and 1Id gave the reault• pre1eAted iu Ta~l• s.2 on 
PAI• 78. Thou• aerial correlation waa preaent neither in auy of 
the f0"1r reduced lllOdela uor bi aodel ll, AX: eJld t.X: vere highly 
lutercorrelated (r14 • 0.9117), end, tbua, any conclualon1 dravu 
from the te•t reaulta of model• including both of tho•• variable• 
mu11t take into accowat, o~ at le••t recoanise, thi1 problem of 
multicollin .. rity. 
Under each redQ.Ced fora of model II, the multiple correlation 
coefficient (I) and J'•ratio were lipUicant at the 1 percent level. 
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That 1a, evn though ti.X: ... 1 and tiX: Wfl'• deleted from model II, each 
of the reduced modell appears to contain the economic v•riablea 
aaaociattd with the rate of .. rger durillJ the period 19,1-1966. In 
fact i w.a greater for lld than for II, auggeating that the inclueioo 
of fjX:. 1 and AX: 111 II did not help to "explain" J\I\ to • areater 
eztent than dld the variable• cODtaine.d in lid. 
However, though i waa Mah••t under lld, mulU.colllnearit7 we• 
alao preaent betvaen 6~ .. 1 and tix!.1 and a tt0re appropriate aodel 
lliabt not include one of tboae variabl••· Since b1 waa conai1tently 
more aip.J.f1c:.nt than b4 , the data aeemad to "fit'' more adequately 
modela Ila and Ilh, each coa.tainillg A~_ 1, than Ile, coctain!Dg 
4 -6~_ 1 • Further, ••a waa ar••t•r uader Ila than under ID>, it would 
2 appear that the addition of llJ:t_ 1 to Ila in order to fOl'm Ile did 
not "explain" the variation in A"t to any higher dear•• than aiapl7 
6~-l and llX: in Ila. Tut 11, lla appear• to embody the aipificaat 
ecODClllic variables, urMly, changea in tbe levela of induatrial 
production and atock price•, correlated with the rate of corporate 
lllfl'8ft" at the agregat• aanufacturlna level during the 19.51-1966 
period. 
Thua, the data •••ed to have aupported the capital urket 
hypotb .. la of • poaitive a•aociation between the rat• of maraer and 
cbangff 111 the level of atock prieea. Thia tentative coaclualon i• 
conaietent with the finding• of ••boa (61, p. 118, Table 60) and 
Weeton (93, p. 80) that merger activity lu the period• 1895-19041 
1919-1930 and 1919-1941 waa poeltlvely related to the level of 1tock 
pl'ic••· 
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Th• bad• for the c.pital a1rket bypotbeaia, •• outlined ill 
Chapter UI11 ta two-fold. lirat, nev aecuritiH iHwtl uy occur 
with merger, and a tbrt'ri.ns capital -..rlc.et, •• depicted by riling 
atock pricea, would eeem to iuure a •rket for new ae.:ur1t1ea 
laaue1. Second, becauoe a firm'• atock.-earninae ra~io .ay become 
abnoraally bisb durtna parioda of ri1iag stock price•, the flrlil would 
be motivated financially to lOWft it• stock earninp ratio by 
acquiring mother fina with a much lower ato~eaninga ratio. 
A decieion on which of tbHe tvo factor• vaa the more iaportaut in 
aotivatlns merger activity in the period 1951-1966 i• not p09aibl• 
here, but apparoutly a f louriahing stock market was favorable in 
acae manner to the development of large-1cal• merger activity. 
AA well •• aupporting the c.tpital Ntrket hypotbeeia of merger 
2 
activity, the data tended to coafira the "recuaiOD" theli• of 
merger activity, aa indicated b7 the •isnificaAtly nec-tive partial 
regreHion caffident of ~~ .. 1• While We1ton aho found a uptive, 
though inaignificant, relation between merger activity and bU8ineaa 
activity in the period 1919-1941 (93, p. 80),•raar 111DVementa have 
generally occurred during proaperoua ti~•• · In addition, .. lean'• 
study of the correlation of the tvo variable• in the period• 1895-
1904 and 1919-1931 yielded positive correlation coefficient• (611 
p . 1181 Table 60) . luthar, if the "receasloa" tbe1i• hold•, the 
l See pp. 60.64. 
2 See pp. 59-60. 
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rtaina merger activity of 1951-1966, at first glance, would seem 
1ncona1atent with the buaine•• prosperity that generally occurred 
during that period. 
However, the ''TeceH1on° tbui• of the rate of merger atatee 
tiult chana•• tn th• level of meraer activity are lnveraely aeaociated 
with chana•• iu the level of buaineaa activity, or induatrial produc-
tion. The hypothe•i• wae te•ted by correlatiaa annual percentage 
cbanaes in the level of merger activity, or 6~ iD the period 1951-
1966 to annual p•r«nt•ge ch•naea in tbe level of induetrial produc-
tion, or X:. 1, in the period 1950-196.5. A oegativ~ partial regraadon 
coefficient would ariae if poaitive ~··were •••ociated vith 
1 ,) 
negati'Ve :\zt .. 1 'a or if "!\ a~d 6~-l 111oved in oppoaite d1rectioos. 
ln the f or..r case, th• level of buaineaa activity would necessarily 
fall froaa one period to the naxt, but buaineH activity generally roe• 
over the 1950-1965 period, •Gd, hence, this uee would •PP••r incon-
aiatent with rtaina levell of ldrger activity. In the latter case, 
the level of bu.ineaa activit7 would lncreaao •• long •• 6x!. 1 waa 
poaltive, yot declinina. Thi• ca•• would appear compatible with tho 
rlaina levela of auger •ctivity in the period 1951-1966. 
A• •tated in Chapter 111, 1 the reHoniug aupport1na the "receHtoa" 
tbe•i• of merger activity would aeea to imply the former ca•• abo~. 
Olltenalbly, duriua rece••iOIUI fin.a are eepecially mot1vat*1 to inc:reaa• 
revenuu and reduce co1ta in order to maintain profit•. Meraera, to 
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the ~ent that they inc:.ru1e 1ale1 &lld achieve econoali•• of operation 
(lower coet•) ar• a maan1 of preeerv1us profit•. Tbue1 accordlng to 
the "receNlon" tb .. 11, the e11oc1atioo of po1itive f)l\'• with 
negative hx:_ 1•a would aee.a nece111ry for the negative relation.ahip 
that 1ctu1ll7 occurred between change• ia the level of auger activity 
and chaugea in the level of bulineH activity. However, 111 illdicated 
pnvioutly / bWtine.1 activity generally :ro1e d01:ing- the period 1950-
196S. That 11, A~-l v11 generally podtive and, bace, would uot 
appear cmaon.ant wt.th the rialn& level of merau acti...S.ty, or podtive 
6_1\ 1 that camoonly occurred in the 1951-1966 period. 
Since both ~-l and ~Mt were uaually poeitive, the inverse 
relatl0111hip preeent during the period 1951-1966 betven cllauges ia 
the leTel of aerger activity and ch1n1e8 in the level of bualne11 
activity v11 apparently due to the movement• of !\!\ and 6~-l in 
oppo1ite dlrectioo.1 •• explained in the latter c.1e above. Al the 
change tn the rate of buainea1 activity decreaeed (incr .. ted), the 
change 1n the rate of merger •ctivity iucreA1aed (decre.1ed). 
O:l• poHible tqlanatioo of the indirect aHodation of change• 
in the level of merger activity vith changea in the level of buaine11 
activity, even vi.th general 1ncruaea iu both mergu activity and 
bueiness activity during the 1951-1966 period ia aa follon: while 
the bu.sin••• proapertty of the 1951-1966 period ttimulated bu11.ne.la 
ezpauion, tbe inaea••• 1D buaineH activity vere not of auffictent 
ma1J11.tude to allow produceT• to achieve deaired profit levels by 
intera:al expaneion; a1 • re1ult, producer• have reaorted to expausion 
by merger. 
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As 1n the analy•i• conducted •t the lnduatry level, date limit•-
ttona eld.eted in tut• of hypotheeee a.t the aggrepte aanufacturlns 
level. On,e not•ble 11-itation reeulted frOl!l the use of bond yf.elda 
as au iudir•rt meaeurc of upital co•t• or the intereat ratee of 
fUllda borrowed for acquiaition ptirpo•ea. Though thie •tudy aaaumed 
that movement• in bond yielde reflected movemcnta in inteTest rate•, 
there waa uo meana of determining the degree to 'Which the two •ov~ 
ments were coincident, or, stated differently, the extent to which 
the aaaumpticm vae juat1ficd. U a direct iudicato'l' of capital coate 
at the agaregatc level could be obtained, a more •PFOPrl•t• end 
rell•ble test of the capital 11&rbt-merge...- hypotbeai• would rHult. 
A second important data 11m1tat1cm, and one equally aermme to 
th• induatt;y level of anal)19i• 1 of the anal19ia at the aagrepte 
level was that merger data could be obtai.ned only on AD. aDnual baa1a 
and, •• a result, the time laga aHumed iD the hypothe•e• .:ere 
neceeurily •t•ted in diacrete unite of one year. Tbua, even if 
.! priori reaeonio.a had auggeeted that movement• in merger actiYl.ty 
lag aov•enta 1R a apec1f1c economic variable by • period vhidl va• not 
• unit number of years, thh etudy would have been unable to test 
l auch a hgged relatiOl18hip. In fact, the growth hypotbceee eet 
forth in thi• atudy may be a caae tn poict. It wae aaaumed that a 
period of one yur vas necesaary for producers to become aw•re of 
BS 
trend• in demand and uming• leveb, while, actually, betvaen one 
.nd two yeara may be required for the trend• to become evident to 
producers. Since the Pederal Trade COlDJliHion ha• compiled qwirterl7 
merger data, it would aeea approprlata to teet more preci•ely an7 
lasac:d relat10l\8hip• tibicb may exi.et between merger activity and 
specific economic variablea. 
Th• data limitatlono preaeot in the te1ts of bypotbuea at both 
the illduatry level and agregete manufacturing level suss.at that 
further research la r~quired to aacertaln completely and reliably 
th• factors respcmsible for, or correlated with, the 1951-19'6 
taerger movement, or aerger activity in general. Further, the public 
l policy implications of aerger activity, a1 outlined in Chapter I, 
IBlld• clear that further reaearch ta warranted. 
l. 
2. 
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